The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
813.
In the absence
of a further resolution, the MOD and FCO considered that it
would
be
necessary to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding or a Status of
Forces
Agreement
(SOFA) with the Iraqi Government.
814.
The MOD and
FCO thought it possible that the Iraqi Government might write
into
a new
Security Council resolution:
•
a
commitment to complete PIC transfer by a given date;
•
more formal
Rules of Engagement;
•
a timetable
for withdrawal;
•
a
commitment that this would be the last resolution of its kind;
and
•
removal of
powers to intern.
815.
The MOD and
FCO judged internment to “make an important contribution
to
force
protection”. If removed, individuals would have to be released or,
in the case of
the
30 percent of detainees where there was a criminal case to
answer, handed to the
Iraqi Government.
816.
During the
DOP(I) meeting, the point was made that Mr Blair’s forthcoming
visit to
Iraq would
offer an opportunity to push for reconciliation, and that the UK
and US should
stress to
the Iraqi Government that continued support and money was
conditional on
seeing
demonstrable progress.445
An unnamed
attendee highlighted the importance of
“resolving
the detainee situation” since 90 percent of detainees were
Sunni.
817.
Ministers
agreed to aim for a renewal of resolution 1723 in 2008 and to share
the
paper
‘Iraq: MNF‑I Mandate in 2008’ with the US.
818.
Reporting on
the situation in Basra, Mr Browne said that 80 percent of the
violence
there was
directed against coalition forces, but that was a manifestation of
the political
struggles
going on beneath the surface. The JAM militia represented a strong
political
force and
there was evidence that some of their attacks against UK forces
were being
funded by
the Iranians. Indirect fire attacks on Basra Air Station remained a
serious
problem;
the US military had lent the UK some Apache attack helicopters
which were
proving
useful.
819.
Mrs Beckett
told Cabinet on 10 May that the outcome of the Sharm
el‑Sheikh
meeting had
been “generally positive”.446
It had been
a useful demonstration of
international
engagement, but in private many had been negative about the
Iraqi
Government.
445
Minutes, 10
May 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
446
Cabinet
Conclusions, 10 May 2007.
152