12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
63.
Mr Drummond
wrote to Sir David Manning on 14 February to outline key
messages
for the US
on “winning the peace”.50
Addressing
the US request that the UK “lead on
reviving
the Iraqi Justice system”, Mr Drummond reported
that:
“We have
asked for clarification of whether they see this as a short term
revival
of existing
structures minus the Ba’ath influence or a much longer term
reform
agenda.”
64.
The following
week, Mr Chilcott informed Mr Straw that an assessment of
UK
capabilities
in the field of police and judicial reform had been sent to the US,
and that
a minute on
the subject was in preparation, but was awaiting “greater clarity
on UK
commitments”.51
In an
accompanying document, Mr Chilcott described the
UK
position
as:
“No
commitment, but UK could consider providing support for UN‑led
justice sector
reform,
providing we had the right UN cover.”
65.
Mr Straw
responded the following day without comment on the UK’s role
in
judicial
reform.52
The
Government has been unable to supply evidence of any
further
consideration
of the US request.
66.
In February
and early March 2003, the main effort within the FCO and No.10
was
the pursuit
of a further UN Security Council Resolution, as described in
Section 3.7.
During this
period, much of the debate around post‑conflict management of Iraq
focused
on the
prospect of the UK taking responsibility for a geographical region
following the
invasion,
as described in Section 6.5.
67.
The MOD Iraq
Secretariat briefed Mr Hoon on 10 February ahead of a visit
to
Washington.53
They
advised that US aftermath planning was “impressive on details”,
but
“riddled
with holes at the political and strategic levels”. The MOD
identified a number of
factors for
consideration:
“SSR will
be a huge issue, both in dismantling the current infrastructure and
growing
a new one.
Will the US look to the current Iraqi police to maintain law and
order,
or will it
train a new force? If US AID [Agency for International Development]
are
legally
prevented from paying police or military salaries, how will SSR be
funded
prior to
the utilisation of oil revenues? What will the new security
apparatus look
like, and
how can it (particularly internal security organs) be made
transparent and
50
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Winning the
Peace’.
51
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day‑After (Phase IV)’ attaching ‘Iraq
Day After:
Guidance for Officials at US Rock Drill’.
52
Minute Owen
to Chilcott, 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day‑After (Phase
IV)’.
53
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 February 2003,
‘Secretary of State’s Visit to
Washington:
Iraq’ attaching Briefing MOD Iraq Secretariat, [undated], ‘Iraq
Aftermath – Summary of Key
Gaps/US‑UK
Policy Differences’.
79