13.1 |
Resources
on 13
February.147
Sir Michael
Jay, Sir Kevin Tebbit and Mr Chakrabarti were
not
present.
234.
In advance of
the meeting, Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of the
Cabinet
Office
Overseas and Defence Secretariat, advised Sir David Manning
that:
“The Prime
Minister will … want to seek Clare [Short]’s engagement in the
potential
humanitarian
relief operation and reconstruction – which will need funding and
the
commitment
of human resources as a priority.”148
235.
IPU briefing
for Mr Straw set out three objectives for the meeting,
including:
“•
encourage
Ms Short to engage fully in planning;
•
persuade
Ms Short that she should allow DFID money to finance small
scale
[reconstruction]
projects in the area administered by a UK
commander.”149
236.
At the
meeting, in response to a question from Mr Blair about whether
the UK
should
“take the lead on humanitarian action in the southern zone”,
Ms Short said that
she was in
favour.150
The UK
could do an “exemplary job” in the zone on both the
military
and
humanitarian fronts.
237.
Mr Blair
concluded that the UK should seek to take the lead on
humanitarian
issues in
the southern zone of Iraq.
238.
Ms Short
wrote to Mr Blair the following day, 14 February, to provide
an update
on
humanitarian preparations and the role of the UN.151
Ms Short
confirmed that,
within an
agreed international framework set out in a second resolution,
there was
a “great
opportunity” for the UK to play an exemplary humanitarian role in
the South:
“But as I
made clear in my letter of 5 February, my department has tight
budgetary
constraints
… Without some understanding on finance, I cannot responsibly
commit
DFID to the
exemplary partnership with MOD which we discussed.”
239.
Mr Blair
wrote on his copy of the letter: “We must get the US to accept
the
240.
On 17
February, a DFID official sought Ms Short’s views on the
implications of
the
decision that “the UK should take the lead on humanitarian issues
in the southern
zone of
Iraq, and do an exemplary job on both the military and humanitarian
front”, and
in
particular how it should balance its limited human and financial
resources between
147
Letter
Cannon to Bewes, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Issues’.
148
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 13 February 2003, ‘Meeting on Iraq: Humanitarian
Follow‑up’.
149
Minute Iraq
Planning Unit to Private Secretary [FCO], 12 February 2003,
‘Meeting on Iraq Day After
Issues
Before Cabinet 13 February’.
150
Letter
Cannon to Bewes, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian
Issues’.
151
Letter
Short to Blair, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Planning and
the Role of the UN’.
152
Manuscript
comment Blair on Letter Short to
Blair, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Planning
and
the Role of
the UN’.
481