The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
117.
No other
Cabinet Ministers were present, and the FCO was not
represented.
118.
The meeting
was scheduled to last for one hour: a 15 minute presentation
from
Adm Boyce
setting out the state of contingent military planning, the proposed
UK
contribution
and the timescales for decision, in the context of current armed
forces
activity
and deployment in the UK and elsewhere in the world, followed by a
45 minute
discussion.
119.
The
presentation to Mr Blair included a briefing on the operational
plan from
Maj Gen
Fry.
120.
The briefing
for Mr Blair from Mr Matthew Rycroft, Mr Blair’s Private
Secretary
for Foreign
Affairs, informed him that the Chiefs of Staff were likely to say
that they
were
“giving up” on getting Turkey’s approval for a northern
option.32
The MOD
wanted
a decision
by the weekend as preparations would become visible by the
following
Tuesday.
121.
As suggested
by Mr Powell, Mr Rycroft provided a list of “some difficult
questions”
for Mr
Blair to put to the Chiefs, including:
•
“Do the US
have a winning military concept?”
•
“Are we
confident we can do our part?”
•
“Are we
sure we have properly thought through the changes forced on us
by
Turkey’s
no?”
•
“Will he
[Saddam Hussein] use WMD?”
•
“What
military involvement do you foresee in the aftermath?”
•
“Will we be
running Basra?”
•
“Will the
targeting in the campaign take account of the need to run (parts
of)
Iraq
…?”
•
“Is it
fully costed?”
•
“Where will
the money come from?”
122.
As well as
the No.10 record of the discussion, several accounts of
the
meeting
were produced by MOD participants.
123.
Mr Rycroft
produced a minute noting that Mr Blair would receive formal advice
on
the land
package the following day, and stating that Mr Blair wanted further
advice on
32
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning: Meeting with Chiefs of Staff’.
33
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
404