1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
525.
On
18 July, a document relating to expenditure of four types of
“special” munitions,
a term
which denoted chemical and biological agent delivery, was
discovered during an
inspection
of the headquarters of the Iraqi Air Force.209
UNSCOM was
not allowed to
copy or
remove the document but it was agreed that it would be jointly
sealed and stored
in the
custody of Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate.
526.
In a letter to
Mr Butler on 23 July, Mr Aziz wrote that the
meetings of biological
experts in
Baghdad on 17 to 22 July had not succeeded in “closing the
gaps between
the two
sides”. Iraq deemed it “highly important to devote sufficient time
to this issue
during our
next meeting … to be able to study it intensively from the
political and
technical
angles”. That might require a longer visit than planned and the
participation
of the
largest possible number of experts.210
527.
Mr Butler
responded on 24 July that he had not yet seen the Chief
Inspector’s
report of
the meetings but:
•
He had “a
problem with the notion of ‘gaps’ between the two sides
because
it,
fundamentally, misrepresents both the nature of the relationship”
between
UNSCOM and
Iraq and the terms of reference for the meetings in
Baghdad.
The
relationship was that “Iraq should declare in full and truthfully
all
relevant
proscribed programmes” and UNSCOM “should seek to verify
those
declarations”.
•
Describing
UNSCOM’s inability to carry out its work as “a mere ‘gap’”
departed
“very far
from the fact of the inadequacy of Iraq’s past
declarations”.
•
The
proposal was similar to one Mr Aziz had made in June, when
Mr Butler had
made clear
that the issue was “establishing facts, not of negotiation between
two
positions”.
•
If the
team’s report was “unsatisfactory”, they would “need to analyse
why”.
But it was
“premature … to conclude that political level discussions …
would
correct a
problem which has been long-standing, repeatedly addressed and
has
always
rested on the failure of Iraq to provide concrete and verifiable
technical
information”.
•
UNSCOM’s
“firm position” continued to be that resolution of the
biological
weapons
issues could “be accomplished with the provision of further
documents
and other
verifiable information” which Iraq possessed.211
209
Federation
of American Scientists, 22 July 1998, ‘Text of Amb. Butler
letter to UNSC protesting latest
Iraqi
obstruction’. Letter Butler to Lavrov [President of Council],
22 July 1998.
210
UN Security
Council, 14 August 1998, ‘Letter dated 23 July 1998 from
the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq
addressed
to the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by
the Secretary-General
pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)’ (
S/1998/718).
211
UN Security
Council, 14 August 1998, ‘Letter dated 24 July 1998 from
the Executive Chairman of the
Special
Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to
paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security
Council
resolution 687 (1991) addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister of
Iraq’ (S/1998/718).
119