9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
without a
UN resolution would be problematic for the UK, but suggested that
this would
be an
important point to reinforce with other US
interlocutors.
383.
Mr Prentice
told the Inquiry that, despite this concern, he had felt
“absolutely joined
at the hip”
with his US colleagues, who had invited him to sit in on their
negotiations
with the
Iraqis on the text of a new resolution in order to ensure that the
UK’s legal
requirements
were satisfied in the resulting text.189
384.
On 14
September, Mr Brown said publicly that the UK would meet
its
responsibilities
and honour its obligations in Iraq.190
Decisions
on the strength of
UK forces
would “continue to depend on conditions on the ground” but would
be
a UK choice.
385.
Mr Prentice
discussed Basra in his introductory meeting with Prime
Minister Maliki
on 15
September.191
Prime
Minister Maliki agreed that Gen Mohan and Maj Gen
Jalil
had done an
excellent job in Basra. He had authorised extra resources to
sustain
the
momentum. He was optimistic that a solution could be found that
would result in
the
replacement of Governor Waili so that Basra would be ready for PIC
within the
next two
months, and that arrangements would be “well under way” by
Mr Brown’s
October statement.
386.
Prime Minister
Maliki emphasised that, despite the ISF’s readiness to take
on
security
responsibility, the UK should be certain about its capacity to
fulfil its agreed
future
roles for the next phase. Mr Prentice assured him that was the
case.
387.
Mr Prentice
also discussed the likelihood of renewing resolution 1723 during
his
introductory
call with Prime Minister Maliki and also with Dr
Rubaie.192
He
reported
that Prime
Minister Maliki believed some change in the MNF mandate was
inevitable,
reflecting
the changed situation in Iraq.
388.
Dr Rubaie
confirmed that negotiations on the resolution should begin formally
in
October, at
the same time as talks on the content of a future US/Iraqi
bilateral security
agreement.
He wanted that bilateral agreement to be in place by January 2009
and
asked
whether the UK would be interested in a similar relationship which
would
encompass
political and economic development as well as
security.
389.
Mr Prentice
said that the UK would still need a firm legal basis for its
continued
presence in
Iraq and would need to know more about the thinking about a
bilateral/
trilateral
security relationship before committing. Obviously the UK could not
be bound
by any
US/Iraqi negotiations to which it had not been party. Dr Rubaie
agreed with
189
Public
hearing, 6 January 2010, page 40.
190
BBC
News, 14
September 2007, Troop
numbers a UK choice – Brown.
191
eGram
38048/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting
with PM Maliki’.
192
eGram
38042/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 September 2007, ‘Iraq: UNSCR
Call on PM Maliki and
Dr Rubaie
National Security Adviser’.
257