5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
657.
The UK
subsequently circulated a draft side statement setting out the six
tests
to a
meeting of Security Council members in New York on the evening of
12 March.257
The draft
omitted an identified date for a deadline and included the addition
of a final
clause
stating:
“The United
Kingdom reserves its position if Iraq fails to take the steps
required of it.”
658.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock commented that the initiative had resulted
in:
“•
genuine
expressions of warmth from the [undecided 6] for taking them
seriously;
•
recognition
that the UK had made a real effort to find a way through for
the
Council;
•
discomfiture
of the negative forces, who sounded plaintive and inflexible
in
their questioning;
•
finally, a
bit of time. I can keep this going at least until the
weekend.”258
•
The UK had
not achieved “any kind of breakthrough. The French,
Germans
and
Russians will undoubtedly home in on the preambular section of the
draft
resolution
and on the whiff of ultimatum in the side statement”.
•
There were
“serious questions about the available time”, which the US
would
“not help
us to satisfy”.
660.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to
obtain
a second
resolution and, following the French decision to veto, the
outcome
remained
open.
661.
Mr Blair
indicated that difficult decisions might be required and
promised
a further
meeting at which Lord Goldsmith would be present.
662.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet that Iraq continued to be in material breach
of
resolution
1441 and set out his view of the legal position.
663.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet that there was “good progress” in gaining
support
in the
Security Council.
664.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain a
second
resolution.
The UK had presented proposals for six “tests”, “endorsed by
Dr Blix”,
to judge
whether Saddam Hussein had decided to commit himself to
disarmament.
Satisfying
those tests would not mean that disarmament was complete, but that
the
257
Telegram
429 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Side-Statement’.
258
Telegram
428 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK
Circulates Side-Statement:
Part
2’.
119