The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
411.
Lord Boyce
explained: “I thought we would be there for three or four years at
least,
and said so
at the time.” He added:
“The
theoretical planning against the Defence Planning Assumptions is
you don’t
do this
sort of operation for an extended period longer than about six
months. But it
never
seemed to me very likely that we would be out [of] there in six
months.”
412.
Asked about
the assumption that the UK contingent would reduce to
“Brigade
level” or
“medium scale”, Lord Boyce replied:
“For the
job that we would have to do in the Basra area, it might have been
that
a Brigade
size might have been sufficient, as conditions pertained in the
middle
413.
On 20
February, Mr Dominick Chilcott, Head of the IPU, sent Mr Straw an
IPU
guidance
note for officials taking part in the Rock Drill.149
414.
Mr Chilcott’s
covering minute to Mr Straw stated:
“There is
barely any mention of the UN in the CENTCOM plans we have seen
for
Phase IV
(post-conflict) to date. But there are gaps in the plan, which is
still fluid and
which we
have the opportunity to influence. We shall encourage the US
players at
the Rock
Drill to draw the conclusion that the job of administering Iraq is
too large
even for
the US to undertake, that putting together a large Coalition –
drawing on
Arab
countries – is the key to success, and that this can only be
achieved by getting
UN
authorisation for Phase IV.”
415.
The attached
guidance note stated that the UK and US agreed that “there must
be
a phased
approach to the ‘day after’”. For the UK, that meant “(a) military
administration,
(b) a UN
transitional administration and (c) handover of power to a new
Iraqi
government”.
The US referred to “stabilisation”, “recovery” and “transition to
security”.
416.
On
sectorisation, the guidance stated:
“•
UK will
have, in the very short term, to administer the area where its
forces are
at the end
of hostilities. No commitment to administer divisional size area in
the
medium to
longer term. More likely a small area around Basra.
•
No
commitment to administering any part of Baghdad.
•
Where we
are involved in administration, will want to be so in
an
exemplary fashion.”
417.
The guidance
stated that the UK force would reduce from large scale
(three
brigades
plus) to medium scale (one brigade plus), “if possible by the
autumn”.
148
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 102.
149
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day-After (Phase IV)’ attaching
Paper
[unattributed and undated], ‘Iraq Day After: Guidance for Officials
at US ROCK Drill’.
448