4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
What I
believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is
that
Saddam has
continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that
he
continues
in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been
able
to extend
the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that,
as stated
in the
document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his
weapons from
UN
inspectors.
The picture
presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more
not
less
worrying. It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of
containment has not
worked
sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from developing these
weapons.
I am in no
doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made
progress
on WMD, and
that he has to be stopped.
Saddam has
used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against
his
own
people. Intelligence
reports make clear that he sees the building up of his
WMD
capability,
and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital
to
his
strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional
domination. And the
document
discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to
be
ready
within 45 minutes of an order to use them.
I am quite
clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has already
done
so, to hide
these weapons and avoid giving them up.
In today’s
interdependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay
confined to the
region in
question. Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using
WMD,
I believe
the international community has to stand up for itself and ensure
its authority
is upheld.
The threat
posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the
hands
of a brutal
and aggressive regime like Saddam’s, is real. Unless we face up to
the
threat, not
only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose
resolutions
he defies,
but more importantly and in the longer term, we place at risk the
lives and
prosperity
of our own people.
The case I
make is that the UN
resolutions demanding he stops his WMD programme
are being
flouted; that since the
inspectors left four years ago, he has continued with
this
programme; that the
inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly;
and
that if he
refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as
he has done in
the past,
the international community will have to act.
I believe
that faced with the information available to me, the UK Government
has been
right to
support the demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with.
We must ensure
that he
does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons
he wants.
561.
As
discussed by the JIC on 11 September, the dossier highlighted
the
contribution
which recent intelligence had made to the assessment of
Iraq’s
activity
since 1998 and on Saddam Hussein’s readiness to deploy and
use
chemical
and biological weapons.
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