10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
19.
The MOD paper
on security assessed that the security situation was
unlikely
to improve
in the immediate future.6
The key to
improving the security situation was
achieving
“buy-in” to the political process and making progress on
reconstruction, at the
same time
as developing the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF).
20.
The paper
highlighted the importance of job creation:
“A major
Iraqi complaint is the failure to meet expectations on
reconstruction. This
has the
double negative effect of creating disaffection with the political
process and
increasing
the pool of unemployed …
“It will
therefore be important that the reconstruction programme creates
sufficient
jobs to
significantly reduce the number of disaffected. In the short term,
continuing
difficulties
in the delivery of essential services could lead to serious
disturbances
during the
summer.”
21.
The DFID paper
on reconstruction and development assessed that the next
six
months
would be critical for establishing stability.7
Better
security would be “central if
there is to
be sustained progress on reconstruction, effective engagement by
the UN
and World
Bank, and if the Iraqi economy is to take off as it
should”.
22.
Other key
issues for reconstruction and development were:
•
minimising
any potential slowdown in reconstruction and development in
the
South over
the summer, in particular as new US structures became
established;
•
building
the capacity of Iraqi institutions to manage
reconstruction;
•
helping the
IIG conclude debt relief negotiations and setting the foundations
for
macro-economic
stability;
•
SSR and
access to justice; and
•
strengthening
social cohesion by supporting Iraqi participation in the
political
process,
strengthening civil society’s ability to advocate for the poor,
and
supporting
the development of the Iraqi media.
23.
At the
meeting, Mr Benn welcomed the fact that “Iraqis were clearly
in charge and
their
voices were being heard”.8
The UK was
moving “from a phase of doing things
for the
Iraqis to supporting them doing it for themselves”. The UK’s focus
was now on
engaging
the UN and World Bank, plugging any funding gap over the summer,
and
supporting
Iraqi institutions to manage the reconstruction process and access
funds.
6
Paper MOD,
[undated], ‘Security: The Next Six Months’.
7
Paper DFID,
[undated], ‘Iraq Reconstruction and Development: UK Priorities for
the Period up
to the Elections’.
8
Minutes, 1
July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
201