4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

analysts become courtiers, whereas their proper function is to report their findings

… without fear or favour. The best arrangement is intelligence and policy in separate

but adjoining rooms, with communicating doors and thin partition walls …”304

739.  Mr Straw told the FAC in 2003:

“The reason why we have a Joint Intelligence Committee which is separate from the

intelligence agencies is precisely so that those who are obtaining the intelligence are

not then directly making the assessment upon it. That is one of the very important

strengths of our system compared with most other systems around the world.”305

740.  The FAC endorsed those sentiments.306 It stated that the JIC has a “vital role

in safeguarding the independence and impartiality of intelligence”; and that the

“independence and impartiality of its own role” was “of the utmost importance”.

It recommended that Ministers should “bear in mind at all times the importance of

ensuring that the JIC is free of all political pressure”.

741.  In its response to the FAC, the Government stated:

“We agree. The JIC plays a crucial role in providing the Government with objective

Assessments on a range of issues of importance to national interests.”307

304  Cradock, Sir Percy. Know your enemy – How the Joint Intelligence Committee saw the World.

John Murray, 2002.

305  Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-2003, 7 July 2003, The Decision to go

to War in Iraq, HC 813-1, paragraph 153.

306  Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-2003, 7 July 2003, The Decision to go

to War in Iraq, HC 813-1, paragraphs 156-157.

307  Foreign Secretary, The Decision to go to War in Iraq. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign

and Commonwealth Affairs, November 2003, Cm6062, paragraph 27.

421