6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
83.
Mr Chaplin
reported that since “military action could start within a few
weeks”, it had
been agreed
to have the first meetings of the new working groups the following
week, if
possible.
84.
Mr Lee
reported to Mr Hoon that the US was beginning to take the
aftermath
seriously
and was willing to work with the UK and Australia in the various
working
groups, but
there was little time left.46
During his
visit Mr Lee had arranged a call on
Lt Gen
Garner at which he had said the UK was “keen to be involved” as
ORHA took
shape. Lt
Gen Garner had been grateful and suggested that the UK feed in
ideas
rather than
wait for him to make requests.
85.
Mr Lee
recommended that Mr Hoon raise post-conflict planning in his
next phone
conversation
with Secretary Rumsfeld in terms that it was a vital issue that
needed “to
be sorted
now because it affects both the UK decision to commit to
hostilities … and
also
international support”, and that there was a need for clarity on
“who is responsible
to whom for
what on day after planning and then execution”.
86.
Ms Miller
informed Ms Short that the talks had provided a useful
opportunity
to deepen
understanding between DFID and the MOD. Unlike the US
participants,
members of
the UK delegation had been in agreement on the main lines of
policy.47
She added
that support from Australia on the role of the UN and
humanitarian
concerns had
been particularly helpful.
87.
Mr Chaplin
told the Inquiry:
“By January
2003, though, as it turned out, that was rather late in the day,
though
we hoped we
would have more time, the Americans were at least listening … So
we
bombarded
the Americans with lots of good advice, we hoped, on the handling
of the
aftermath
and said it needed to be considered, which actually matched pretty
well
with what
the State Department had done.”48
88.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell on 23 January that the UK expected its
troops
to be in
Iraq for “quite a long time”.
89.
Mr Straw
saw Secretary Powell in Washington the day after the inter-agency
talks.49
The Embassy
reported that, in addition to emphasising the need to involve the
UN in
46
Minute Lee
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 23 January 2003, ‘Aftermath: Visit
to Washington’.
47
Minute
Miller to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 23 January 2003,
‘UK/US/Australia talks, Washington:
22 January
2003’.
48
Public
hearing, 1 December 2009, page 37.
49
Telegram 91
Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Lunch With
US Secretary
of State, 23 January’.
325