The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
(c) the
fragility of our transport and supply links to the airport … There
are
few
helicopters in theatre, those that we do have are prone to
breakdown
(because
they are worked so hard) and, when it comes to getting a
seat,
the military
take priority over civilians;
(d) the
difficulty and danger involved in moving around Basra City …
Because
we depend
on the military for support, road moves have to be planned well
in
advance and
are sometimes cancelled at the last moment because of
other
operational
priorities …
(e) the
vulnerability of the BPC to indirect fire (mortars and rockets)
…
“We need to
accept that the risks for UK‑based staff are high and do
everything
possible to
mitigate them. For example, we have mitigated the major threats
(IDF
[indirect
fire], EFP and kidnapping) to an acceptable extent by providing
hardened
living
accommodation, limiting helicopter flights to the hours of
darkness, varying
routes,
using Warriors or three vehicle convoys, as appropriate, requiring
minimum
movement
outside after dark and full body armour and constantly reviewing
our alert
status in
the light of the latest intelligence …
…
“For LE
staff the threat is much greater and, I judge, increasing. We and
IPU are
wrestling
with the dilemma of how to justify continuing to employ a bare
minimum
of staff
… in the light of the current threat to them.” 301
455.
Dr Marsden
advised that the next six to nine months would be critical to
Basra
and the UK
legacy. The UK needed “to maintain a big operation here during that
period
– and
indeed somewhat expand it”. The level of risk was likely to
increase in the short
term with
the planned military surge (Operation Salamanca, see Section 9.5),
but the
reinforcement
of the UK military presence in the BPC from 430 to 600 with the
arrival of
an
additional Warrior company would mean better patrolling and
harassment of potential
firing
points.
456.
On 1
September, Mr Casey sent Mrs Beckett a paper on staff and
security issues
in
Iraq.302
The paper
stated that:
•
LE staff
and contractors were particularly vulnerable;
•
intimidation
of LE staff had led to severe staff shortages;
•
the number
of LE staff in Basra had been reduced to the bare
minimum;
•
restrictions
to mitigate the risks to UK‑based staff were observed, “but
erode
further
staff’s quality of life (and options to do anything other than
work)”;
•
nurses were
available in Baghdad and Basra to monitor staff health and
welfare;
301
Letter
Marsden to Casey, 31 August 2006, ‘Basra: Post
Security’.
302
Minute
Casey to Private Secretary [FCO], 1 September 2006, ‘Foreign
Secretary’s Visit to Iraq,
4‑6
September’ attaching Paper, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Visit to Iraq:
Background Brief’.
324