10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
people”
were in place (the PRT had “marshalled an impressive array of UK
and partners’
talent”),
and teams in Basra were working together “more closely than ever”
through the
southern
Iraq Steering Group.
598.
The transition
to PIC in Dhi Qar province took place on
21 September.345
599.
Maj Gen
Shirreff reported on 28 September that Operation SINBAD (the new
name
for Op
SALAMANCA) had at last begun, after a “tortuous” round of final
negotiations
with Iraqi
politicians.346
600.
On 5 October,
at the request of the FCO, the JIC assessed the performance of
the
Iraqi
Government, its level of popular support and its prospects over the
year ahead.347
The JIC
judged that after five months in office:
“… the
faction-based Iraqi Government is proving ineffective …
Co-ordination
between and
within Government ministries is poor. None of this looks likely
to
improve in
the near future. Meanwhile, sectarian and insurgent violence is
at
a record
high, and fuel, water and electricity shortages persist across
much
of the country.”
601.
The 12 October
meeting of DOP(I) received a paper by officials on the
medium‑term
prospects for Iraq.348
602.
A DFID
official advised Mr Benn in advance of the meeting that the
paper had
been
“inspired by” Mr Patey’s valedictory telegram (which had
assessed that strategic
failure in
Iraq was a distinct possibility but not inevitable), and was set in
the context of
increasing
insecurity.349
603.
The official
advised Mr Benn that discussions around the paper provided a
good
opportunity
for DFID to reassure departments – especially the MOD – that it
was
“shouldering
our share of the burden” in Iraq. DFID’s two current projects in
the South,
the IISP
and the Governorate Capacity Building Project, were due to finish
in March
2007, when
DFID would aim to close its office in Basra. Deteriorating security
meant no
new
projects could be designed or implemented. There was “little/no
expectation” from
the MOD or
FCO that DFID would continue to invest in infrastructure, given the
flow of
US CERPs
money and anticipated investments by Japan, the World Bank and the
Iraqi
Government
itself. The official concluded:
“We have
largely won the argument that DFID should shift focus from
physical
investments
in Basra to technical assistance in Baghdad to maximise our
impact,
and the
[medium-term] paper reflects this in its
recommendations.”
345
Report
Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update –
21 September 2006’.
346
Report
Shirreff, 28 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update –
28 September 2006’.
347
JIC
Assessment, 5 October 2006, ‘Al-Maliki’s Government: Interim
Progress Report’.
348
Paper, 10
October 2006, ‘Iraq: Medium Term Prospects and
Implications’.
349
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 6 October 2006,
‘Iraq: Future for DFID
Programme
from 2007’.
295