14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

1051. The MOD told the Inquiry that Phoenix was withdrawn from theatre in June 2006

and, although it had been suggested that it might be redeployed that September, it did

not re‑enter service.555

1052. In July, Gen Dannatt wrote to Gen Jackson about “four major concerns” he had

as “the Force provider”.556 His “first and overriding concern” was protected mobility which

is addressed earlier in this Section. Two of those other concerns related to ISTAR and

battlefield helicopters.

1053. Gen Dannatt wrote that he shared Gen Granville‑Chapman’s concern about

ISTAR support for land operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. He stated that there was

“an urgent need for a full estimate process to ascertain the requirement” and judged

that “such an estimate would identify the need for an easily deployable UAV capable of

operating beyond the line of sight, under the control of the tactical ground commander,

and responsive to his information requirements”.

1054. Gen Dannatt saw this “as complementary to the more immediate re‑allocation

of current resources and longer‑term Equipment Programme solutions. Such a capability

was always within the original vision for the Watchkeeper programme; the need is

now acute.”

1055. Gen Dannatt acknowledged that the paper on battlefield helicopters would be

considered by the Chiefs of Staff that week but wrote that he “would be remiss if I failed

to stress the importance of resolving this issue as a matter of urgency”. He stated:

“Operational experience continues to drive home the inextricable linkages

between ISTAR, protected mobility and BH. When the two former capabilities are

under stress … we invariably place a higher call on the latter, a call that we find

increasingly difficult to meet, given the limited resources at our disposal. The issue

is one of flying hours as well as the provision of sufficient numbers of aircraft and

their spares. The key and developing role of AH [attack helicopters] on operations

in Afghanistan, coupled with significant shortfalls in support funding, brings this into

even sharper focus.”

1056. Gen Dannatt wrote that action was urgently needed to continue operations and

“minimise casualties to our soldiers”. He stated: “Process must not be allowed to stand

in the way.”

1057. On 4 July, the Chiefs of Staff discussed the papers on rotary wing and ISTAR

operational shortfalls.557 AM Nickols emphasised that both were “immature and had

been produced to a tight timescale to allow COS to take a view on what action was

required now”.

555 Letter Duke‑Evans to Hammond, 4 February 2016, [untitled].

556 Letter Dannatt to Jackson, July 2006, ‘The Level of Operational Risk on Current Operations’.

557 Minutes, 4 July 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

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