The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of
re‑engaging seriously with the international community. Anything
less than a
forthcoming
response would amount to an admission of guilt, confirming that he
was
in material
breach of the … UN resolutions.
“The second
part would deal with inspections. This would stipulate that
the
inspectors
would have sixty days to certify that they had now been granted
full and
unfettered
access to all installations and materials in Iraq, with provision
for them
to report
back to the Security Council … If Saddam were co‑operating,
inspections
could
continue after the sixty day period. This part of the resolution
would cover the
conditions
… including free access (anyone, anywhere, anytime) … and an
explicit
invitation
to all members of the international community to provide full
intelligence to
the
Inspectors.”
488.
Dr Rice
told Sir David that the US had abandoned the idea of seeking
force
protection
for UNMOVIC and the second part of the resolution could be
“dispensed with”
if the
response on a declaration was “unsatisfactory”. She said the US and
UK “could
argue that
this would amount to a material breach and provided a green light
for action”.
“… there
were attractions in demanding a declaration from Saddam although
we
should not
kid ourselves: he was likely to refuse, or to announce blithely
that there
had been no
discrepancy with UNSCOM and all his WMD had long since
been
destroyed.
But his response would show either that he was unco‑operative
and
obstructive;
or that he was ready to make claims that the inspectors would
probably
quickly
expose.
“But …
there could be no question that the second part of the resolution
could
be
dispensed with if Saddam’s response to the first part seemed
unsatisfactory.
As …
[Mr Blair] had told President Bush at Camp David, it was
essential that the
resolution
stipulated intrusive inspection, and that this was carried out.
This was the
only way in
which the international community would believe that we were
serious
about the
UN route. I reiterated forcefully the points you had made at Camp
David
about
avoiding any impression that the resolution was merely a pretext
for quick
military
action, or that we were not sincere when we said that our preferred
option
was the
reintroduction of an inspection regime. However unsatisfactorily
Saddam
responded
to the first part of the proposed resolution, we were bound to be
faced
with a
chorus of demands that we should test his response by getting
the Inspectors
back into
Iraq. It was only after they had reported that we could move onto
the
enforcement
issue.”
490.
Dr Rice
“pressed” Sir David, who said he:
“… was
absolutely clear. We needed the international community behind us;
this
meant a
resolution that did not appear to be a pretext for military action;
and this in
turn meant
serious commitment to UNMOVIC inspections. I was confident that
this
176