6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
“In
addition, a mine countermeasures group” would deploy ahead of the
group “to
undertake a
series of exercises and port visits in the Gulf
region”.
1213.
Mr Hoon
added that the UK was also considering the deployment of
“additional
maritime
forces early in the new year to ensure the readiness of a broad
range of
maritime
capabilities, should they be required”.
1214.
Mr Hoon
was advised on 11 December not to push the issue with
Turkey
until early
January, and that the UK was likely to face increasing US pressure
to
look at
other options.
1215.
Mr Bowen,
who had attended the briefing for Mr Hoon on 11 December,
reported
to
Sir David Manning that Adm Boyce had informed Mr Hoon
that the absence of a
northern
front was not now regarded as a showstopper.475
He added
that “the one
certainty
appears to be that an extra 45 days must be allowed for deployment
if planning
were to
switch from the North to the South”.
1216.
Further advice
on Turkey, including options for high level UK visits and
actions
after the
Copenhagen Summit was provided for Mr Hoon on 11
December.476
1217.
Mr Johnson
wrote that: “We need clarity as soon as possible” because if
the
response
was positive it would take some time to “thrash out all the
practical details”
and, if the
response was negative, alternatives needed to be
considered.
1218.
Mr Johnson
advised that: “We should not push the issue hard until the Turks
have
said Yes to
the US request”. Mr Hoon’s visit scheduled for 6 to 8 January
looked like
the right
opportunity. If Mr Hoon did decide to “push the issue hard”
then “experience
(eg over
ISAF) suggests that only high‑level engagement is likely to make a
difference”.
1219.
On “handling”
Turkey, Mr Johnson stated that the northern option “came from
our
strategic
analysis in the first place” and that deployment timelines were:
“45 days’ [sic]
shorter
than to the South (though we could in theory solve this problem by
buying up
more
sealift)”. Assuming a political decision was made on 15 February,
“air elements”
would be in
action from early March and the main ground effort from mid‑April.
Although
the UK
would want to pre‑position air weapons at the end of the year, it
“would not need
to deploy
additional air and ground forces until 15 February”. Turkey was
less likely to
help the UK
than the US.
475
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: CDS Briefing of
Mr Hoon’.
476
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq:
Military Planning –
Turkey Handling’.
357