1.1 | UK Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000

506. Following consultations between the members of the Security Council on the

UNSCOM and IAEA reports, the President issued a statement on behalf of the Council

on 14 May which:

• welcomed the improved access for UNSCOM and the IAEA;

• expressed the hope that the Government of Iraq’s agreement to fulfil its

obligations would “reflect a new Iraqi spirit with regard to providing accurate and

detailed information in all areas of concern”;

• expressed concern that the reports indicated that Iraq had “not provided full

disclosure in a number of critical areas, in spite of repeated requests from the

Special Commission”;

• noted that discharge of UNSCOM and the IAEA’s mandates required full

co‑operation from Iraq, “including fulfilment by Iraq of its obligations to provide

full, final and complete declarations of all aspects of its prohibited programmes”;

• noted that the IAEA’s investigations over several years had “yielded a

technically coherent picture of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme, although

Iraq has not supplied full responses to all of the questions and concerns of

the IAEA”, including enacting penal laws on prohibited activities and whether

any Government document existed recording a government-level decision to

abandon the nuclear programme; and

• affirmed its intention “upon receipt of a report (in October) from the Director

General of the IAEA stating that the necessary technical and substantive

clarifications have been made, including provision by Iraq of the necessary

responses to all IAEA questions and concerns”, to adopt a resolution agreeing

that the IAEA should dedicate its resources to ongoing monitoring and

verification.199

507. Mr Ekéus explained to the Inquiry that he had had “little belief” that Saddam

Hussein would have been attracted by the idea of keeping WMD sensitive material in his

private residence; and that events proved this assumption was correct.200

508. In response to a meeting of the Security Council on 27 April at which sanctions had

been discussed, Mr Al-Sahaf forwarded an open letter from Iraq’s Revolution Command

Council and the leadership of the Iraqi branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party

complaining about the injustice of continued sanctions.201 It asserted that the purpose

of sanctions was to “hurt the Iraqi people and to force the Security Council to remain

the pawn of a single member [the US], assisted by the old imperialist devil, the English

policeman”. The letter also complained about “unfounded accusations and blatant lies”

in Mr Butler’s reports to the Council.

199 UN Security Council, ‘3880th Meeting Thursday 14 May 1998’ (S/PV.3880).

200 Statement Ekéus, 23 April 2011, page 4.

201 UN Security Council, 1 May 1998, ‘Letter dated 1 May 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq

addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/1998/368).

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