4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
45.
A global
survey of chemical and biological weapons on 28 October
addressed
the
practicalities of producing chemical and biological weapons and how
they
might be
used.
46.
It stated
that intelligence indicated that Iraq continued to produce
chemical
agent. It
assessed that Iraq was producing chemical and biological agents
and
that the
agents could be weaponised; it did not say that Iraq was doing
so.
47.
At the request
of the MOD, the JIC issued a Current Intelligence Group
(CIG)
global
survey of chemical and biological weapons on 28
October.14
It provided
a general
assessment
of the practicalities involved in producing and using chemical and
biological
agents, and
an assessment of the capabilities of several countries, including
Iraq. It
highlighted
the relative ease with which many chemical and biological agents
could be
produced
and disseminated, and the impact of their use.
48.
The Key
Judgements stated:
“•
There are
few significant technical problems in the production or
dissemination
of many
chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW)
agents.
•
Ballistic
missiles and most conventional munitions, such as artillery
shells,
rockets and
aerial bombs can be modified to deliver agent. It can also
be
sprayed
from land or marine platforms and a variety of aerial
systems.
•
BW agents
are less suitable for some battlefield roles than CW because
they
generally
act more slowly. CBW could play an increasing role in military
thinking,
especially
asymmetrically. The use of even small quantities of CW could
help
redress
conventional superiority on the battlefield. BW agents have the
potential
for covert,
deniable delivery which is particularly suited to terrorist-type
attacks
and
asymmetric warfare.
•
The
potential for the proliferation of CBW is increasing. Arms control
treaties and
export
regimes hinder, but cannot stop the trends.
•
There is a
growing risk of secondary proliferation [of technical
knowledge
and
experience as well as equipment and hardware] between countries
of
concern. […]
•
States are
increasingly using sophisticated denial, deception and
concealment
methods,
including the use of dual-use and/or underground facilities, to
hide
their
activities.”
14
CIG
Assessment, 28 October 2002, ‘Global Chemical and Biological
Weapons Survey’.
299