The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
951.
Following a
visit to Iraq from 4 to 15 April Mr Brahimi briefed a meeting
of the
UN Security
Council on 27 April on his ideas for the formation of the Interim
Iraqi
Government.525
He had
“previewed” some of them in a press conference before
returning
from Iraq.
952.
Mr Brahimi
stated that “the sooner a credible Iraqi Government is in place
…
the better”
and observed that:
“Between
security on the one hand and the end of Occupation, the restoration
of
sovereignty
and independence and the advent of a legitimate Iraqi Government
and
political
regime on the other, there is a dialectical link that is obvious.
Security is
essential
for the [political] process to be completed.”
953.
The proposal
outlined by Mr Brahimi was for an Interim Government with
a
“very
qualified” Prime Minister, a President and two Vice Presidents,
supported by a
consultative
assembly or council. This, he suggested, was a simple model
supported by
most Iraqis
to whom he had spoken. The key task for the Interim Government
would be:
“… to tend
to the day-to-day administration of the country in as effective
and
efficient
manner as possible, and only until such time as a
democratically-elected
Government
can be put in place.”
954.
Mr Brahimi
suggested that the Interim Government should be selected by the
Iraqi
people
themselves through a process of meeting and consultation supported
by the UN.
He hoped
that could be completed before the end of May 2004, giving those
identified a
month to
prepare for government.
955.
Mr Brahimi
also gave his support to a National Conference, convened by
a
preparatory
committee of “reputable and distinguished” Iraqis who were not
seeking
elected
office. The conference would “engage in a genuine national dialogue
on the
country’s
challenges”.
956.
On 28 April,
in an update on Iraq, the JIC assessed that:
“… the core
of anti-Coalition forces in Fallujah is based on former regime
elements
(FRE),
including former Republican Guard and Special Forces. They are
well
957.
The JIC judged
that:
“Offensive
action by Coalition Forces – particularly in Fallujah – even if
well targeted
and limited
in scale, will exacerbate a volatile security situation and cause
further
long-term
damage to Coalition objectives.”
525
UN Security
Council resolution 4952 (2004).
526
JIC
Assessment, 28 April 2004, ‘Iraq Update’.
362