The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
105.
Mr McKane
recommended that Sir David should reply to Mr Hoon’s letter
of
31 May
seeking “further and better particulars on the timelines and
precisely what
decisions
incurring significant expenditure would be required now in order to
keep open
the
possibility of a large scale deployment in six months
time”.
106.
Sir David
commented to Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of
Staff: “We
certainly
need much greater precision from MOD.”48
107.
Mr Powell
replied that he believed there was “a danger of getting ahead
of
ourselves
here unless this is absolutely necessary to get us into detailed
military
planning
with the US”.49
He
recommended discussing the issue with Mr Blair.
108.
Sir David
Manning asked Mr McKane to “confirm that it is now
absolutely
necessary
to get into the detailed planning with the US”.50
He added:
“I suspect it is
if we are
to have a voice.”
109.
On
25 June, Sir David wrote to Mr Peter Watkins, Mr Hoon’s
Principal Private
Secretary,
referring to Mr Hoon’s letter of 31 May.51
He
stated:
“… the
Prime Minister has asked for further advice on precisely what steps
would
have to be
taken now, including financial commitments, in order to keep open
the
possibility
of deploying a large scale force by the end of this year – bearing
in mind
we may not
get six months warning …”
110.
Mr Watkins
replied on 26 June with an update on the MOD’s understanding
of US
plans.52
He wrote
that a small MOD team would be going to Washington and
Tampa
“immediately”
and that would inform whether the UK could “secure adequate
influence
for a large
scale contribution”. That would determine the need to commit
resources, on
which
Mr Hoon would provide “specific advice” shortly.
111.
Lt Gen
Pigott, Air Marshal Joe French, Chief of Defence Intelligence,
and
Mr Desmond
Bowen, MOD Director General Operational Policy, visited Washington
and
CENTCOM
from 27 to 29 June 2002.53
112.
Before they
left, Major General Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Joint
Operations
(Operations)
(DCJO(Ops)) from May 2002 to July 2003, provided a paper
commenting
on US
planning, which at that stage offered two basic
approaches:
48
Manuscript
comment Manning on Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
49
Manuscript
comment Powell on Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
50
Manuscript
comment Manning on Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
51
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 25 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
52
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 26 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
53
Minute Fry
to MA/DCDS(C), 26 June 2002, ‘Comments on US Planning for
Possible Military Action
Against
Iraq’.
18