The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
‘doing
alright’ so far, but this would soon not be good enough”. She
undertook to raise
the problem
of moving funds from CPA(Baghdad) to CPA(South) in
Washington.
518.
Mr Hoon
said that the South could be an example of progress for the whole
of Iraq.
Dr Rice
responded that it was important that the South should be a
success.
519.
Dr Rice asked
if the drawdown of UK forces in southern Iraq meant a
lessening
of UK
commitment to the area. Mr Hoon replied that force levels were
based on an
assessment
of the security situation. He added that it was important that
“significant
funds” for
reconstruction flowed into the area if a successful outcome was to
be achieved.
520.
Dr Rice called
on Sir David Manning on the same day. Sir David
expressed
concern
about the lack of consultation by the US with the
UK.282
Dr Rice
indicated that
she had
heard about the problems, and had “taken these on
board”.
521.
Baroness Amos
visited Iraq from 25 to 26 June, the first visit to Baghdad by
a
Cabinet
Minister since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime.283
She met a
range of Iraqi
officials,
a group of Iraqi women, Mr Vieira de Mello, Ambassador Bremer
and
UK
officials.
522.
In her initial
report to Mr Blair on 27 June, Baroness Amos advised that life
in Basra
had
regained an air of normality.284
However,
Iraqi expectations were high; restoring
services to
pre-war levels would not be enough. CPA(South) was administratively
very
weak. The
UK could make the South “a ‘model’”, but this would require a clear
vision of
what should
be done and strong leadership. Baroness Amos recommended
Ambassador
Olsen’s
immediate replacement.
523.
Baroness Amos
also highlighted the lack of communication between the CPA
and
the Iraqi
people, both in Basra and Baghdad: “Rumours of our intent and
motives feed
insecurity.
People still think we are in it for the oil.”
524.
On the same
day, the FCO advised No.10 that the UK should seek to
replace
Ambassador
Olsen with a UK official, if he carried out his threat to
resign.285
An
effective
UK official
could improve CPA(South)’s performance and give a boost to
reconstruction.
The UK
would in any case probably want to provide a successor to
Ambassador Olsen
when his
tour ended in October. The FCO’s advice was not copied to other
government
departments.
282
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 27 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Condi Rice,
27 June’.
283
Telegram 56
IraqRep to FCO London, 26 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Baroness Amos
Visit’.
284
Letter Amos
to Blair, 27 June 2003, ‘Iraq’.
285
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 27 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Ambassador Olsen’.
92