The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
b. That the
UK role should be to develop and sustain a broad international
coalition
to deal
with the humanitarian crisis in co-operation with the UN and other
key
international
players.”
It
added:
“Assumption
a) is credible if the UN has a mandate and active support from
its
members to
do so. The situation might be different in the event of military
action not
backed by
the UN. Assumption b) is in line with current UK humanitarian
policy.”
624.
The draft
listed possible humanitarian consequences of military action,
including:
•
large-scale
civilian loss of life;
•
internal
and international population displacement;
•
significant
infrastructure and environmental damage;
•
inter-factional
clashes within Iraq; and
•
use of
chemical and biological weapons.
Likely
emergency requirements included provision of basic needs and:
“Early focus on
recovery
initiatives, particularly linking into infrastructure and
environmental damage,
and the
impact on livelihoods.”
625.
The draft
explained that DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs
Department
(CHAD) was
undertaking a “short-term desktop study of the humanitarian
situation” in
central and
southern Iraq. If restrictions on external contacts with
humanitarian agencies
were
lifted, CHAD would obtain a fuller picture of contingency planning
and agency
capacities.
The CHAD Operations Team (OT) was accelerating its post-Afghanistan
refit
and being
brought up to its full authorised strength of 30.
626.
The draft also
stated that:
“Any
large-scale UK humanitarian response would require additional
funding from
the Central
Reserve. DFID’s existing small (£6m) humanitarian programme in
Iraq
is fully
committed; available humanitarian funds within CHAD are likely to
be grossly
insufficient
and most of DFID’s contingency reserve has already been
allocated.”
627.
The draft
paper did not consider whether there was a need for
contingency
plans
should either of the underlying assumptions prove
wrong.
628.
The Inquiry
has seen no indication that DFID addressed that possibility
in
any detail
until February 2003.
629.
The DFID
desktop analysis of central and southern Iraq
highlighted
the extent
of economic decline, the deterioration in public services and
the
vulnerability
of the population.
220