The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
thereafter
to the entire region of the Middle East … so that it is free of
mass
destruction
weapons”.
7.
The letter
challenged a statement made by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK
Permanent
Representative
to the United Nations in New York, that Iraq had been provided
with
the
opportunity to dispose of its weapons of mass destruction, but Iraq
had ignored
that
opportunity and decided to keep possession. The letter asked why
“none of
the
representatives” of the members of the Security Council had “asked
… when,
how or
where such an alleged decision had been taken by Iraq to keep
weapons of
mass destruction”.
8.
Iraq referred
to the American Administration having exerted pressure and
threatened
to leave
the UN if it did not agree to what America wanted; and that America
threatened
to
perpetrate “aggression”. Iraq feared that the United Nations may
“lose the trust and
interest of
peoples”. “All those” who were concerned about the organisation
were “called
upon to
exercise caution and act in accordance with international law and
the Charter of
the United
Nations”.
9.
Iraq appealed
to Mr Annan to ensure that those implementing the resolution
did not:
“… push the
situation to the edge of the precipice … because the people of
Iraq
will not
choose to live if the price is their dignity, homeland, their
freedom or things
sacrosanct
to them. On the contrary, the price will be their lives if that is
the only way
forward to
preserve what must be preserved.”
10.
The UK
remained sceptical about Iraq’s intentions, focusing on its
track
record of
deceit and deception, and repeating the need to maintain the
threat
of military
action to secure compliance.
11.
In a lecture
that evening, Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, welcomed
Iraq’s
response
“so far as it goes” but added:
“… we must
remain vigilant for experience with Iraq tells us to temper
optimism with
scepticism
and to read the small print. Iraq’s intentions are notoriously
changeable.
What
matters above all is their actions not their words.
“… The
history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq is littered with examples
of
deceit,
evasion, intimidation and harassment. I hope even Iraq will
recognise the
consequences
of any repeat. If Saddam fails to co‑operate fully, then he faces
force.
“UNSCR [UN
Security Council resolution] 1441 sets out the pathway to
peace.
Those of us
who negotiated the text were determined to ensure that it
was
not a set of
traps for Iraq … But we must be clear: he will not comply unless
he
is sure
that the international community has another route to disarmament –
the
2
The
National Archives, 13 November 2002, The Future
of Foreign Policy.
6