The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
444.
The
instructions made it clear that Lord Goldsmith should not provide
an immediate
response.
445.
When Lord
Goldsmith met Mr Powell, Sir David Manning and Baroness
Morgan
(Director
of Political and Government Relations to the Prime Minister) on 19
December,
he was told
that he was not, at that stage, being asked for his advice; and
that, when
he was,
it would be helpful for him to discuss a draft with Mr Blair
in the first instance.
446.
Until 7 March
2003, Mr Blair and Mr Powell asked that Lord Goldsmith’s
views on
the legal
effect of resolution 1441 should be tightly held and not shared
with Ministerial
colleagues
without No.10’s permission.
447.
Lord Goldsmith
agreed that approach.
448.
Lord Goldsmith
provided draft advice to Mr Blair on 14 January 2003. As
instructed
he did not,
at that time, provide a copy of his advice to Mr Straw or to
Mr Hoon.
449.
Although Lord
Goldsmith was invited to attend Cabinet on 16 January, there
was
no
discussion of Lord Goldsmith’s views.
450.
Mr Straw
was aware, in general terms, of Lord Goldsmith’s position but he
was
not
provided with a copy of Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice before
Cabinet on 16 January.
He did
not read it until at least two weeks later.
451.
The draft
advice of 14 January should have been provided to Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon
and the
Cabinet Secretary, all of whose responsibilities were directly
engaged.
452.
Lord Goldsmith
provided Mr Blair with further advice on 30 January. It was
not
seen by
anyone outside No.10.
453.
Lord Goldsmith
discussed the negotiating history of resolution 1441 with
Mr Straw,
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, with White House officials and the State Department’s
Legal
Advisers.
They argued that resolution 1441 could be interpreted as not
requiring a
second
resolution. The US Government’s position was that it would not have
agreed
to resolution
1441 had its terms required one.
454.
When Lord
Goldsmith met No.10 officials on 27 February, he told them that
he
had reached
the view that a “reasonable case” could be made that resolution
1441 was
capable of
reviving the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 (1990)
without a
further
resolution, if there were strong factual grounds for concluding
that Iraq had failed
to take the
final opportunity offered by resolution 1441.
455.
Until that
time, No.10 could not have been sure that Lord Goldsmith would
advise
that there
was a basis on which military action against Iraq could be taken in
the
absence of
a further decision of the Security Council.
64