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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
145.  The US and UK should seek to persuade others, including Dr Blix, that that was
the “true view” of resolution 1441.
146.  Mr Blair used an interview on Breakfast with Frost on 26 January to set out the
position that the inspections should be given sufficient time to determine whether or
not Saddam Hussein was co-operating fully.58 If he was not, that would be a sufficient
reason for military action. A find of WMD was not required.
147.  Mr Blair’s proposed approach to his meeting with President Bush was discussed
in a meeting of Ministers before Cabinet on 30 January and then discussed in general
terms in Cabinet itself.
148.  In a Note prepared before his meeting with President Bush on 31 January, Mr Blair
proposed seeking a UN resolution on 5 March followed by an attempt to “mobilise Arab
opinion to try to force Saddam out” before military action on 15 March.59
149.  When Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, it was clear that the window of
opportunity before the US took military action would be very short. The military campaign
could begin “around 10 March”.60
150.  President Bush agreed to seek a second resolution to help Mr Blair, but there were
major reservations within the US Administration about the wisdom of that approach.
151.  Mr Blair confirmed that he was “solidly with the President and ready to do whatever
it took to disarm Saddam” Hussein.
152.  Reporting on his visit to Washington, Mr Blair told Parliament on 3 February 2003
that Saddam Hussein was not co-operating as required by resolution 1441 and, if that
continued, a second resolution should be passed to confirm such a material breach.61
153.  Mr Blair continued to set the need for action against Iraq in the context of the need
to be seen to enforce the will of the UN and to deter future threats.
The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council
widens
154.  In their reports to the Security Council on 14 February:
Dr Blix reported that UNMOVIC had not found any weapons of mass
destruction and the items that were not accounted for might not exist,
but Iraq needed to provide the evidence to answer the questions, not
belittle them.
58 BBC News, 26 January 2003, Breakfast with Frost.
59 Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], ‘Countdown’.
60 Letter Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush
on 31 January’.
61 House of Commons, Official Report, 3 February 2003, columns 21-38.
590
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