The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
145.
The US and UK
should seek to persuade others, including Dr Blix, that that
was
the “true
view” of resolution 1441.
146.
Mr Blair
used an interview on Breakfast with
Frost on
26 January to set out the
position
that the inspections should be given sufficient time to determine
whether or
not Saddam
Hussein was co-operating fully.58
If he was
not, that would be a sufficient
reason for
military action. A find of WMD was not required.
147.
Mr Blair’s
proposed approach to his meeting with President Bush was
discussed
in a
meeting of Ministers before Cabinet on 30 January and then
discussed in general
terms in
Cabinet itself.
148.
In a Note
prepared before his meeting with President Bush on 31 January,
Mr Blair
proposed
seeking a UN resolution on 5 March followed by an attempt to
“mobilise Arab
opinion to
try to force Saddam out” before military action on
15 March.59
149.
When
Mr Blair met President Bush on 31 January, it was clear
that the window of
opportunity
before the US took military action would be very short. The
military campaign
could begin
“around 10 March”.60
150.
President Bush
agreed to seek a second resolution to help Mr Blair, but there
were
major
reservations within the US Administration about the wisdom of that
approach.
151.
Mr Blair
confirmed that he was “solidly with the President and ready to do
whatever
it took to
disarm Saddam” Hussein.
152.
Reporting on
his visit to Washington, Mr Blair told Parliament on
3 February 2003
that Saddam
Hussein was not co-operating as required by resolution 1441 and, if
that
continued,
a second resolution should be passed to confirm such a material
breach.61
153.
Mr Blair
continued to set the need for action against Iraq in the context of
the need
to be seen
to enforce the will of the UN and to deter future
threats.
154.
In their
reports to the Security Council on 14 February:
•
Dr Blix
reported that UNMOVIC had not found any weapons of
mass
destruction
and the items that were not accounted for might not
exist,
but Iraq
needed to provide the evidence to answer the questions,
not
belittle them.
58
BBC
News,
26 January 2003, Breakfast
with Frost.
59
Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Countdown’.
60
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 31 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush
on
31 January’.
61
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
3 February 2003, columns 21-38.
590