3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
is) to
assert plausibly that our intended action carried, in any sense,
the implicit
authorisation
of the UN on the basis of the revival doctrine.”
260.
Sir Jeremy
suggested that “it was difficult to gauge, with all the fluid
dynamic of
current
telephone calls, where anyone might be on a new proposal”. The
“middle ground
[countries]”
were “constantly cross-checking with each other”. His “best
judgement” was
that it
would be worth trying the second and third options during informal
discussions
the
following afternoon. Avoiding providing the US “with a new basis
for the use of force”
was a
“major criterion for most members of the Council, and he would need
to make
clear that
the options proposed did not do that. If that revealed opposition
which could
not be
overcome, that would leave the fourth option “leaving our
benchmarks out there
if this
has better political resonance”.
261.
The open
debate on Iraq in the Security Council on 11 and 12 March is
addressed
later in
this Section.
262.
By the end
of 11 March, it was clear that Mr Blair’s efforts to
persuade
President
Bush to extend the deadline for military action, while he tried to
secure
support
from other members of the Security Council for a second
resolution
determining
that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered by
resolution
1441, had
almost reached the end of the road.
263.
There were
also concerns that if a majority in the Council supported
the
resolution,
France, Russia and China might all exercise their
veto.
264.
Mr Campbell
wrote that on 11 March there was a “Growing sense of
crisis”,
and that:
“We
desperately need some change in the diplomatic weather. The best
thing may in
the end be
to go in without a vote because of the timings, and that once
troops are
in there
the mood changes. But short of that, which was risky enough, it was
hard to
see how the
dynamic changed.”87
265.
Mr Cook
wrote that on 11 March he had asked Mr Powell to press on
Mr Blair
his view
that, without a second resolution, Mr Blair could not have
military action.88
If
Mr Blair
went “to the House with no UN resolution he may well be defeated if
he persists
in going to
war”.
87
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
88
Cook
R. The Point
of Departure. Simon
& Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
445