12.2 | Conclusions: Security Sector Reform

38. On 2 September 2003, in a meeting of Ministers and senior personnel, Mr Blair said

that he believed that the key to the security situation in Iraq was “the rapid mobilisation

of an effective Iraqi police force”.23 That included increasing Iraqi police manpower to

70,000 within three months. That ambitious new target brought forward the timescale

set by the CPA for reaching that size of force by more than six months.

39. The Inquiry has seen no evidence pre‑dating 2 September of the origins of

the proposal to accelerate training so dramatically, or of analysis of whether it was

achievable.

40. The IPU advised that existing policy was to provide 70,000 police officers by

mid‑2004 and train 40,000 for the New Iraqi Army within one year. It listed some ideas

for how SSR could be accelerated and improved but did not suggest any further

resources beyond those which were already in train. The advice did not assess how

those suggestions would be resourced and implemented and did not provide an analysis

of whether Mr Blair’s target of 70,000 officers was achievable.

41. A briefing paper for Mr Blair by Mr Richmond stated that Ambassador Bremer did

not think that Mr Blair’s target was achievable.

42. The IPU paper and Mr Richmond’s advice suggested that, at the very least, detailed

work was needed to assess whether it was possible to accelerate the training timetable

in the way Mr Blair proposed, and what resources that would require, before the idea

was pursued further.

43. Sir Michael Jay, as the senior official accountable for the resourcing of the UK’s

police reform effort, should have ensured that such an assessment was made. The

AHMGIR, chaired by Mr Straw, failed to assess whether Mr Blair’s target and the IPU’s

suggestions could be achieved.

44. Mr Blair pressed the idea of acceleration, including with President Bush, without

having requested or considered such detailed advice. Ahead of a video conference with

President Bush on 5 September, Mr Blair sent the President a Note which stated:

“Iraq has 37,000 police. We need to double that. Given the number of trainers and

their facilities, that will take a year. We cannot wait that long. So: if we need to treble

or quadruple the trainers and expand the numbers of Iraqi police even beyond that

contemplated, we should do it …”24

45. The record of the video conference between Mr Blair and President Bush stated that

Mr Blair had said a “big push” was required to boost numbers and speed up training of

Iraqi Security Forces.25

23 Letter Cannon to Adams, 2 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Briefing for the Prime Minister’.

24 Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 5 September 2003 attaching ‘Note on Iraq’.

25 Letter Canon to Adams, 5 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video‑Conference with Bush,

5 September’.

423