The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

operations was that some risk would have to be taken on fitting UOR equipment,

but that risk was “considered acceptable”.

292. The risk that some equipment might not be delivered in time for the start

of operations does not appear to have been drawn to Ministers’ attention or

discussed.

293. The development of the military options between mid-December 2002 and

mid-January 2003, the decision to offer 3 Commando Brigade for the amphibious

assault, and the decision on 17 January to deploy two brigades for operations in

southern Iraq rather than one brigade for the northern option, are addressed in detail in

Sections 6.1 and 6.2.

294. Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 16 January seeking agreement to the “key role in

southern Iraq” proposed by the US for the UK.142

295. Mr Hoon stated that the timescales for possible action would mean that some risk

would have to be taken on the fitting of UOR equipment, but that risk was “considered

acceptable”.

296. Following a telephone conversation, Sir David Manning replied to Mr Watkins

on 17 January that Mr Blair was “content to proceed on the basis of the Defence

Secretary’s recommendations”.143 The UK would proceed with Package 3.

297. Mr Hoon made a statement in Parliament on 20 January announcing that the

Government had “reached a view” of the composition and deployment of a land force

package for potential military action in Iraq.144 That would include the Headquarters of

1st (UK) Armoured Division, comprising 7 Armoured Brigade, 16 Air Assault Brigade and

102 Logistics Brigade.

298. The total number of personnel would be “approximately 26,000 personnel”

which was in addition to the “around 4,000 personnel” already being deployed with

3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines.

299. As Section 6.2 shows, it was envisaged that 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines

would have a combat role at the start of the land campaign in mid-March. The roles to

be played by 16 Air Assault Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade were less defined. It was

envisaged that 16 Air Assault Brigade would relieve US forces in an area south of Basra

approximately 10 days after the start of operations. 7 Armoured Brigade would protect

the US flank.

142 Letter Hoon to Blair, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land Contribution’.

143 Letter Manning to Watkins, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Land Contribution’.

144 House of Commons, Official Report, 20 January 2003, columns 34-46.

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