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3.6  |  Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003
had hugely superior military was likely to have the most impact on Iraqi opinion
“so we have agreed MOD should step up their military preparedness briefing”;
rebut negative stories, including the “charge that the conflict is all about oil”;
“… make more of the issue of WMD more generally, and make the link (largely
unbelieved here or in the US) with terrorism. It is a theoretical link, not yet an
actual one, and the US, in continuing to make claims of an actual link, risk being
counter productive”; and
have “better answers to the charge of double standards re Israel, which is the
single biggest impediment to effective communications in the region”.
375.  Mr Campbell concluded that there was “a big job of work to do” which would
“require a lot of input” from Mr Blair and set out a list of potential communications
opportunities in January.
376.  Mr Campbell also set out the arrangements he had put in place to “implement
a major communications strategy, including:
a weekly strategy meeting;
daily reviews;
daily US conference calls;
CIC [Communications and Information Centre] reactivated;
excellent output by the Islamic Media Unit;
a small but effective presence in Amman (media route to Baghdad); and
good co‑operation with the Agencies.”
377.  Mr Campbell also sent Mr Blair an “agreed Iraq strategy document”, advising
him that it showed “a lot of work has been done, and we have the outlines of a good
communications strategy”.
The absence of a “smoking gun”
378.  Mr Straw told Secretary Powell on 30 December that the US and UK should
develop a clear “plan B” postponing military action on the basis that inspections
plus the threat of force was containing Saddam Hussein.
379.  On 24 December, Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that the UK was:
“… clear that a second resolution should be sought if justified. Such an approach
was essential from the point of view of UK politics. Although we had not sought or
received definitive legal advice, I thought it would be hard going with our Attorney
General if there were no second resolution. It would be especially difficult for us
without a second resolution except in a ‘Kosovo‑equivalent situation’ (where we had
a majority in the Security Council but were vetoed by one P5 Member only).”132
132  Letter Straw to Manning, 24 December 2002, ‘Conversation with Powell: Iraq’.
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