3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
had hugely
superior military was likely to have the most impact on Iraqi
opinion
“so we have
agreed MOD should step up their military preparedness
briefing”;
•
rebut
negative stories, including the “charge that the conflict is all
about oil”;
•
“… make
more of the issue of WMD more generally, and make the link
(largely
unbelieved
here or in the US) with terrorism. It is a theoretical link, not
yet an
actual one,
and the US, in continuing to make claims of an actual link, risk
being
counter
productive”; and
•
have
“better answers to the charge of double standards re Israel, which
is the
single
biggest impediment to effective communications in the
region”.
375.
Mr Campbell
concluded that there was “a big job of work to do” which
would
“require a
lot of input” from Mr Blair and set out a list of potential
communications
opportunities
in January.
376.
Mr Campbell
also set out the arrangements he had put in place to
“implement
a major
communications strategy, including:
•
a weekly
strategy meeting;
•
daily
reviews;
•
daily US
conference calls;
•
CIC
[Communications and Information Centre] reactivated;
•
excellent
output by the Islamic Media Unit;
•
a small but
effective presence in Amman (media route to Baghdad);
and
•
good
co‑operation with the Agencies.”
377.
Mr Campbell
also sent Mr Blair an “agreed Iraq strategy document”,
advising
him that it
showed “a lot of work has been done, and we have the outlines of a
good
communications
strategy”.
378.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell on 30 December that the US and UK
should
develop a
clear “plan B” postponing military action on the basis that
inspections
plus the
threat of force was containing Saddam Hussein.
379.
On 24
December, Mr Straw told Secretary Powell that the UK
was:
“… clear
that a second resolution should be sought if justified. Such an
approach
was
essential from the point of view of UK politics. Although we had
not sought or
received
definitive legal advice, I thought it would be hard going with our
Attorney
General if
there were no second resolution. It would be especially difficult
for us
without a
second resolution except in a ‘Kosovo‑equivalent situation’ (where
we had
a majority
in the Security Council but were vetoed by one P5 Member
only).”132
132
Letter
Straw to Manning, 24 December 2002, ‘Conversation with Powell:
Iraq’.
69