12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
•
purging
malign elements in the ISF (both those that are corrupt and those
which
are aligned
to political groupings); and
•
working
with MNF‑I on higher end military tasks relating to the insurgency,
and
gradually
taking over these tasks.”
1217.
The Iraqi
Government would need to demonstrate its grip on Basra
through:
“•
serious and
visible engagement from Baghdad;
•
if
necessary, an appropriate show of strength by the ISF, reflecting
their growing
capabilities;
and
•
encouraging
and co‑operating in the process of security
transition.”
1218.
On 31 May,
Prime Minister Maliki visited Basra and declared a state
of
emergency,
after which he placed a five‑man Emergency Committee in charge
of
delivering
a plan to address security in the city.1141
That
Committee then appointed
Governor
Mohammed Waili as responsible for the security plan.
1219.
On 18 June,
the MCNS endorsed the Basra Security Plan and
recommended:
•
expanding
the Basra Security Committee to include a number of
Basrawis;
•
appointing
a new overall security co‑ordinator for Basra; and
•
that the
Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Defence should increase the
forces
available
for Basra, even if this was to the detriment of policing and
military
operations
elsewhere.1142
1220.
The Committee
had also considered whether the Basra Chief of Police and
the
Commander
of 10th Division should be removed from post but had concluded
they
should
remain for the time being.
1221.
Major General
Richard Shirreff took over as GOC MND(SE) from mid‑July.
At
this time
there had not yet been agreement on the implementation arrangements
of the
Basra
Security Plan.1143
In
particular, there was no overall Iraqi security
co‑ordinator.
The Provincial
Council, however, had voted to replace the Basra Chief of
Police.
1222.
Maj Gen Shirreff’s
first weekly report as GOC MND(SE) set out his initial
reflections
on the situation facing him.1144
He
wrote:
“The issue
in Basra is the lack of security and until we establish this there
can be
no PIC
[Provincial Iraqi Control]. We can only generate freedom of
movement by
mounting
specific operations, often up to company level, and we are
effectively fixed
by the lack
of concentrated force. The lack of security means that we cannot
conduct
the SSR
needed to transform the police, nor apply the economic
inducements
1141
Minute
Cooper, 8 June 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8 June
2006’.
1142
Minute
[junior officer] to MA/CJO, 22 June 2006, ‘MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update – 22 June 2006’.
1143
Minute
Cooper, 13 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 13 July
2006’.
1144
Minute
Shirreff, 21 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21
July 2006’.
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