6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
110.
In the context
of advice about Iraq’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon
(see
Section
4.1), AM French commented in a minute to Mr Webb that,
“Despite the work
going on in
the Pentagon”, he could “not see a significant possibility of a
large‑scale
military
attack on Iraq taking place this year”.57
111.
In AM French’s
view, the US would be “taking a calibrated approach”:
•
“The ‘axis
of evil’ could be considered as the start of an IO
[information
operations]
campaign.”
•
“The US
would respond to international opinion by giving UNMOVIC
[UN
Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission] another chance, but
with
a much
more intrusive regime.”
•
The IO
campaign was “part of a move to foment opposition to Saddam
Hussein
inside
Iraq”.
•
“The US
would consider the selective use of military force, air strikes, to
aid
a coup,
which must come from inside the country.”
•
“If all the
above fail then consideration would have to be given to
large‑scale
military
action.”
•
Large-scale
military action would come “into play quickly should Iraq be
shown
to be
complicit in terrorist attacks using WMD”.
112.
The minute was
also sent to Adm Boyce.
113.
In response to
Mr Hoon’s request at his meeting on 19 March, the DIS
advised
that a
ground offensive from Kuwait through Basra and coalition
destruction of regime
security
organs in southern Iraq, calls for a democratic Iraq, or the
attempted imposition
of a
government in exile, were all likely to increase resistance to a
coalition attack.58
As
long as he
was seen as defending Sunni hegemony in Iraq, that was Saddam
Hussein’s
greatest
strength.
114.
Mr Hoon
sent a minute to Mr Blair on 22 March, which included
Mr Hoon’s
assessment
that Saddam Hussein was “only one unpleasant dimension” of the
“key
strategic
problem” of the spread of WMD, and that a more active
counter‑proliferation
strategy
was needed for the region as a whole. That is addressed in Sections
3.2
115.
In relation to
possible military action, Mr Hoon identified three factors
that the UK
should keep
in mind in considering how to support President Bush:
“•
The US
already has heavy land forces in the region … [and] is planning on
the
basis that
it would take 90 days to deploy all necessary forces to the
region;
it would
take us longer.
57
Minute CDI
to Policy Director, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraq – Nuclear
Weapons’.
58
Minute
PS/CDI to PS/SofS [MOD], 26 March 2002, ‘Axis of Evil:
Iraq’.
59
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
193