The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

165. The report also stated:

“The situation surrounding Iraq’s 51st Mechanised Infantry Division remains

confused. A lot of its equipment has been abandoned and its personnel have

vanished. In the South, UK and US are meeting small pockets of resistance … and

some seems to be local militia … But this could indicate that Coalition Forces are

likely to be the subject of harassment and sabotage for some time to come!”

166. In relation to the wider campaign, the report said:

“Tommy Franks intends to maintain (and if possible increase) the momentum of the

push towards Baghdad. At present leading elements of the US V Corps are just

south of Najaf … The focus of air activity is now on counter-land operations against

SRG [Special Republican Guard] and RG [Republican Guard], although command

and control, WMD and regime HQs are also being targeted.”

167. A letter from Mr Watkins to Sir David Manning on the same day, forwarding an

initial assessment of progress against the main military campaign objectives, recorded

that the military campaign was “broadly proceeding to plan”, with pockets of resistance

but “no signs of internal uprisings”.114

168. The MOD update that evening stated that 7 Armoured Brigade was “arrayed

around [the] outskirts of Basra … Will not be in Basra tonight, as previously thought.” 115

169. The COBR overnight report for 23/24 March stated:

“Reporting from Basra suggests the heavy presence of internal security forces from

the Saddam Fedayeen, the DGI [Directorate of General Intelligence] and the Ba’ath

Party militia … Key (UK) decision now concerns when and how to enter the city

[Basra].” 116

170. Adm Boyce told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 24 March that local militias in

Basra were putting up resistance and 1 (UK) Div would proceed with caution in taking

control there.117

171. Mr Hoon stated that the Iraqis would try to draw the Coalition into the cities, where

fighting would be difficult. The next 24 hours would show whether the Republican Guard

intended to try to bar the Coalition’s advance on Baghdad.

172. The meeting also discussed media reporting, which had started to play up the

difficulties of the military campaign, and its impact on local politics: “Expectations had

been created and would now need to be managed if they were unrealistic.”

114 Letter Watkins to Manning, 23 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Progress of Military Campaign’.

115 Briefing [MOD], 23 March 2003, ‘Annex to Evening Sitrep 23 March: Military’.

116 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 23/24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR Overnight Sitrep’.

117 Minutes, 24 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.

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