The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
prioritise
resources for Helmand. Maj Gen Shaw wrote: “We have been hamstrung
for
resources
throughout the tour, driven by the rising strategic significance of
the Afghan
158.
During a visit
to Iraq in October 2007, ACM Stirrup was briefed by
Major
General
Graham Binns, General Office Commanding MND(SE) from August 2007
to
February 2008,
that the ISF might have only limited ability to cope in the event
that JAM
resumed
combat operations. The JIC and others also identified continued
weaknesses
in the ISF.
Their “ability and willingness to maintain security in the South
remains patchy
and
dependent on MNF training, logistic and specialist air
support”.55
Decisions
on the UK’s role in Basra post-PIC were also taken without the
opportunity for
Ministerial
discussion, despite Mr Brown’s 11 September commitment that
Cabinet would
have “a
further opportunity to discuss” the UK’s future role in
Iraq.
Mr Brown
informed the Overseas and Defence Sub-Committee of the NSID of the
content
of his
statement to Parliament a few hours before making it on 8 October
2007.
As a
consequence, Ministers did not have the chance to
explore:
•
precisely what
the number of troops proposed would be able to deliver;
or
•
conditions in
Basra.
The
decision had been discussed with the US, and with some Ministers
individually, but no
collective
discussion took place before 8 October. We cannot now know what
difference
such a
discussion might have made.
Although
bilateral conversations are a useful and necessary part of
preparing for
Committee
discussion, they are not an adequate substitute. The effective
operation
of
a system of collective responsibility is founded on the
opportunity for informed and
timely discussion.
159.
On 27 February
2008, the JIC assessed security prospects in the South at
the
request of
the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ): security in Basra
remained
a concern.
160.
In March 2008,
Prime Minister Maliki instigated the Charge of the Knights to
tackle
militia
groups in Basra. That such an important operation came as a
surprise was an
indication
of the distance between the UK and Iraqi Governments at this
point.
54
Letter Shaw
to Houghton, 14 August 2007, ‘Post operation report Shawforce
Jan-Aug 07’.
55
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Security Prospects in the
South’.
498