The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

940. On 6 February, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of Air Staff, replied:

“The RAF can sustain its current commitments, but with the likely increased

involvement in Afghanistan our air transport, support helicopters and possibly

RAF Regiment forces will be seriously stretched.”497

941. The minutes of the DMB on 26 February 2004 agreed a large number of service

enhancements and savings measures as part of the Spending Review.498

942. The DMB recognised that rotary capability “had been a constraint for some

time”. Helicopters were “used everywhere, and were one of the key ingredients of

lower intensity operations”. On that basis, several proposed measures affecting

“key operational enablers (Puma, Gazelle, Sea King, Chinook) had already been

reprieved” but a number of remaining measures reduced DLO support capability.

943. The DMB considered a paper by Mr Woolley which detailed all the measures.499

944. Mr Woolley wrote: “The Army’s current and planned operational tempo

exceeds Defence Planning Assumptions.” His paper had taken into account work

from commitments and programmes staff, in conjunction with Front Line Commands

and PJHQ, to assess the UK’s current and likely future military commitments over the

following 30 months. That assessment was:

• Iraq would continue to be a medium scale operation until the end of March 2006

when it would downsize to a small scale operation.

• The Afghanistan commitment would remain small scale until January 2005 when

it would increase to a “small(+) to medium scale(‑)” until the end of January

2006. It would become a small scale operation from the end of January 2006.

945. Mr Woolley wrote that Land Command had previously taken a number of measures

into its core programme to contain expenditure within control levels, including the

reduction of rotary environmental training by 25 percent which had “impaired battlefield

helicopter readiness and constrained operational flexibility in Northern Ireland”. There

had been further reductions in rotary wing activity in Northern Ireland as part of a

deliberate switch in operational focus to Iraq.

946. Mr Woolley wrote:

“Collectively, these measures have already started to erode the Army’s core

competencies in war‑fighting at formation level, and overall readiness levels.

The cumulative effect of this will be to progressively degrade the effective delivery

of force elements within the Land component.”

497 Minute CAS to PSO/CDS, 6 February 2004, ‘Operational Tempo’.

498 Minutes, 26 February 2004, Defence Management Board meeting.

499 Paper Finance Director, [undated], ‘ST/EP04: Years 1 and 2’.

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