The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
In May
2003, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order No.2 “dissolved”
a number of
military
and other security entities that had operated as part of Saddam
Hussein’s regime,
including
the Armed Forces. Neither the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) nor the
Ministry of
Interior
(MOI) was dissolved. The UK’s role in the development of this Order
is addressed
in Section
9.8.
There was
nothing in CPA Order No.2 that prevented former employees of the
military
from
applying to join the New Iraqi Army (NIA), although the provisions
of Order No.1
(removing
“full” members of the Ba’ath Party – see Section 11.1) would
apply.
Sir David
Manning, the Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of
the Overseas
and Defence
Secretariat, told the Inquiry:
“… these
were policies that added to the difficulties, because we might
have
addressed
the security vacuum by trying to encourage Iraqi police, Iraqi
military, to
co‑operate
with us, instead of which, they are disbanded and then become
natural
dissidents
and potential insurgents.”9
Disbanding
the Iraqi Army automatically increased unemployment in
Iraq.
In November
2003, Mr David Richmond, the Prime Minister’s Special
Representative on
Iraq,10
reported
that issue had dominated discussions during his recent visit to Ar
Ramadi,
the capital
of Anbar Province. He stated that “unemployment had forced many to
do illegal
acts,
including attacks on the Coalition”.11
De‑Ba’athification
had “made it impossible for
most of
them to be employed by the State. The governor said that 50 percent
had joined
the Ba’ath
Party not out of conviction but because it was a condition of
employment;
40 percent
for material gain; and only some 10 percent because they
supported
Ba’athist ideology”.
Although a
monthly stipend for those with at least 15 years’ service (who were
not senior
Ba’athists)
had been introduced at the end of June, many struggled to gain
access to the
payments.
Ms Ann Clwyd, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to Iraq on Human
Rights
from 2003
to 2009, told the Inquiry about a meeting with a senior army
officer who had
queued for
his stipend for two weeks without reaching the front of the queue.
He had told
her: “if
they want to humiliate us, this is the way of doing
it”.12
Issuing
Order No.2 was a key CPA decision which should have been considered
between
Washington
and London. It was to have a long‑term impact on the development of
the
insurgency
in Iraq.
21.
A more
proactive UK strategy for policing in Iraq – produced by UND and
sent to
No.10 by
Mr Straw – was endorsed by Mr Blair in early June. Its
immediate objective
was “to
stabilise the security situation by creating an effective interim
police force
with
international civilian police working alongside Iraqi police and
Coalition military
9
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 91.
10
Mr David
Richmond was temporarily the Prime Minister’s Special
Representative on Iraq. In September
2003 (on
the arrival of Sir Jeremy Greenstock) Mr Richmond became
the Deputy.
11
Teleletter
Richmond to FCO London, 23 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Sunni Outreach:
Visit to Ar Ramadi’.
12
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 26‑27.
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