The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
new lessons
from Operation TELIC were “the need to give greater thought to
future
ECM,
protected mobility and [Type] B vehicle desertisation
requirements”.
268.
The
requirement for PPVs on operations continued to grow. Immediate
needs
were being
met by the redeployment of vehicles from Northern Ireland and
desertisation
would be
complete by the end of May 2004,132
“despite
delays in receiving clear
requirements
and UOR funding”. There was concern “over the longer‑term
sustainability”
of Snatch’s
“aged, petrol‑engined chassis” but the funding brought forward from
EP04
would “help
address this issue”.
269.
Maj Gen Gilchrist
wrote that the DEC(SP) minute of 7 July had provided
“a sensible
framework … to commence project activity” using the twin‑track
approach:
“ … in
the short term (1‑2 yrs), a life extension for Snatch, and in the
medium term
a new
COTS [commercial off‑the‑shelf] PPV, a little larger than Snatch”.
The life
extension
programme, “known as Snatch 2”, was already under way. The business
case
had been
approved and trial vehicles had been delivered in
June.
270.
On FRES,
Maj Gen Gilchrist wrote that, following the announcement
of the its
Assessment
Phase on 5 May 2004, it was envisaged that a contract would be let
in
late 2004,
leading to Main Gate approval “for the system and simpler FRES
variants”
in late
2006.
271.
At ECAB on 20
July, although “disappointment” was expressed at the pace
with
which FRES
was being taken forward, the meeting was told that “the collective
view of
the IAB
[Investment Approvals Board] was that the project had not been
sufficiently well
thought
through in terms of requirements”.133
272.
ECAB also
noted that “the Army needed better to influence the equipment
and
planning
communities”.
273.
In discussion
of the review of the Army Equipment Programme by
Maj Gen Richards,
it was pointed out that “it should be made clear that developing
an
initial
medium weight capability [between 2005‑2009] was based on existing
equipment
and did not
depend on FRES”.
274.
The IED threat
in Iraq continued to grow.
275.
On 28 June
2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formally
handed
over to a
sovereign Iraqi government. The security situation in Iraq remained
febrile.
The chronology
of events and their impact on the UK’s overarching strategy is
detailed
132
Maj Gen Gilchrist’s
report was written in July 2004. It is not clear whether the
process of desertisation
had been
completed by the end of May 2004 or whether it was still under
way.
133
Minutes, 20
July 2004, Executive Committee of the Army Board
meeting.
48