The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
365.
Mr Wright
responded to Mr Webb’s letter on 5 September, emphasising
the
importance
of understanding how any operation “might impact not only on our
Iraq policy
but on the
region as a whole”.200
366.
Discussions
between the UK and US on the proposed contingency plans
continued
for some
months, and at the highest levels. The UK’s objective was to
moderate the
US
proposals.
367.
The matter was
not resolved until July 2002.
368.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary reported to Sir David Manning on 22 July 2002
that
Lord
Goldsmith had agreed to UK participation in attacking the target
set, with the
exception
of three regime targets which would be attacked by the
US.201
In the
event of
a legal
challenge, the Attorney General had advised that there would be a
need for the
UK to
disassociate itself from that part of the action. That could damage
US/UK bilateral
relations.
Mr Hoon proposed that the UK should agree a joint US/UK plan on
that basis.
370.
The
circumstances in which the plan needed to be implemented did not
arise.
371.
In early
August, the British Embassy Washington reported that it appeared
that a
debate was
heating up in Washington on the balance between different strands
of US
policy
(sanctions, military containment and regime
change).203
372.
In a
discussion with Mr Webb in mid-August, a senior Pentagon official
stated that
regime
change was needed to prevent Iraq from acquiring a credible WMD
capacity and
becoming
the dominant regional power.204
373.
In early
September, a senior State Department official advised the British
Embassy
Washington
that activity on ideas for regime change was “much ado about
nothing”.205
374.
Published
American accounts described this debate. On 1 August, a paper
entitled
‘A
Liberation Strategy’ was presented to the National Security
Council.206
It
proposed
phased
pressure on Saddam Hussein and support for the Iraqi opposition; no
policy
recommendation
was made to the President.
200
Letter
Wright to Webb, 5 September 2001, ‘Iraq: US Contingency Planning
for the Loss of an Aircraft’.
201
Letter
Williams to Manning, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraqi No Fly Zones: Contingency
Planning for the Loss of an
Aircraft’.
202
Manuscript
comment Blair on Note Manning to Prime Minister covering Letter
Williams to Manning,
22 July
2002, ‘Iraqi No Fly Zones: Contingency Planning for the Loss of an
Aircraft’.
203
Telegram
886 Washington to FCO London, 3 August 2001, ‘Iraq’.
204
Telegram
937 Washington to FCO London, 18 August 2001, ‘Webb’s visit to
Washington: Iraq: Military
Aspects’.
205
Telegram
1004 Washington to FCO London, 6 September 2001, ‘Iraq: Views of
US’.
206
Woodward
B. State of
Denial. Simon &
Schuster UK, 2006.
262