The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

and undertook “to accord UNSCOM and the IAEA immediate, unconditional and

unrestricted access”.

456. The MOU contained details of special procedures for the inspection of the

eight Presidential sites, including having diplomats, not just technical experts, in the

inspection teams.187

457. Mr Annan wrote that Secretary Albright had travelled to New York on 22 February

to set out “red lines” before he left for Baghdad. He had “had to remind her” of his role

and that, as Secretary-General, he was “answerable to 191 other Member States” and

that it was his “duty to seek peaceful resolution of disputes”. His objective had been to

give Saddam Hussein a ladder to climb down so that inspections could resume.

458. Mr Annan wrote that he considered it “critical” that Iraq was “given a sense of light

at the end of the tunnel” as an incentive to co-operate with an inspections regime that

required “a degree of scrutiny without precedent”, and that the talk in Washington of

never lifting sanctions was not helpful:

“The United States and its allies were entitled to state this position as a matter

of national interest. However, they could not expect to have a United Nations

committed to the peaceful disarmament of Iraq to simply play along. Nor could they

have been unaware that this gave Saddam the excuse to tell the rest of the world

that the game was fixed no matter what he did. We need the inspections to work

toward resolving the ongoing crisis in Iraq. Until then, the Gulf War would not truly

be over.”

459. In a statement to the House of Commons on 24 February, Mr Blair said the

UN inspectors had found and destroyed “horrific amounts of chemical and biological

weapons … despite systematic obstruction, deceit and concealment by Saddam

Hussein”. The crisis over access to Presidential palaces had “not been an artificial

argument about some theoretical threat, but a reflection of real alarm … about the use

of those sites to conceal both evidence and actual weapons”.188

460. Mr Blair added:

“We should never forget that if we do not stop Saddam Hussein acting in breach

of his agreement on weapons of mass destruction, the losers will not just be those

threatened by him, but the authority and standing of the UN itself …”189

461. In Mr Blair’s view, “nothing else” apart from “effective diplomacy and firm

willingness to use force” would have changed Saddam Hussein’s mind and produced