The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
that the
management of the Iraqi police and judicial system in the first 60
days of
Occupation
would “condition the longer term”. The UK would need to know more
about:
“•
Whether the
US envisaged dismantling the Ba’ath Party.46
While this
is probably
justified
it would leave big gaps in the apparatus of the State.
•
How much of
the Saddam Hussein security structure they [the US] plan to
retain.
•
Whether the
US envisaged a Kosovo style pillar structure, with a
Coalition
member
leading each part. If so, what were the other pillars and who had
been
invited to
lead them.
•
What would
the UN role be? We would need the UN to legitimise Security
Sector
Reforms. We
accept that the UN would not deliver in time to manage the
initial
60 days,
but could play a useful role in the medium term on all aspects of
judicial
reform.”
59.
It was agreed
at the meeting that Mr Chilcott would pursue those questions
in
Washington
at the next round of talks on 5 February between the UK, US and
Australia.
The issue
would then be considered at a meeting on 7 February. If it was
decided to
“proceed
further”, a scoping exercise would be undertaken by DFID, the MOD
and
“probably”
the Home Office.
60.
The British
Embassy Washington’s report of the talks on 5 February did not
mention
the
proposal of the US that the UK take lead responsibility in reform
of the judicial
61.
On 10
February, Mr Drummond wrote to Mr Chilcott to share a
draft of “key
messages
for the Defence Secretary and David Manning to put to Donald
Rumsfeld and
Condi Rice
[Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security
Advisor]”.48
The
US request
that the UK lead on the IPS and judiciary was not addressed in the
paper.
62.
On 12
February, in a brief written to prepare Mr Straw for a meeting
with Mr Blair on
“Day After
issues”, the FCO advised that the UK was still considering whether
it should
accept the
US request that it become “lead nation on justice throughout
Iraq”.49
The
FCO
stated that
“it would be very difficult to do this without a UNSC [UN Security
Council]
Resolution
authorising a transitional administration”.
46
The Ba’ath
Party, dominated by individuals linked to Saddam Hussein, were in
power in Iraq at the time
of the
invasion.
47
Telegram
167 Washington to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
US/UK/Australia Talks on “Day After”
Issues, 5
February’.
48
Letter
Drummond to Chilcott, 10 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Key Messages’
attaching Paper Cabinet Office,
10 February
2003, ‘Iraq Post Conflict: Key Messages’.
49
Minute IPU
[junior official] to Private Secretary [FCO], 12 February 2003,
‘Meeting on Iraq Day After
Issues
before Cabinet, 13 Feb’.
78