The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

609. UNMOVIC had informed Sir Jeremy Greenstock on 11 March that Iraq had

provided names of personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq’s WMD

programmes and had said “they were willing to provide more in particular areas

on request”.204

610. Dr Blix’s reports to the Security Council presented a nuanced picture. He did

not say that Iraq was complying, but neither he nor Dr ElBaradei had reported to the

Security Council that Iraq was not complying or that the inspectors could not complete

their tasks.

611. In his report of 7 March, Dr Blix stated that, when the quarterly report had been

finalised, there had still been “relatively little tangible progress to note” and the report

had been “cautious”.205 By 7 March, however, there was more. Iraq had accepted

the destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles and associated items and that constituted

a “substantial measure of disarmament … the first since the middle 1990s”.

612. In relation to other recent Iraqi initiatives, Dr Blix stated:

“One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant

co‑operation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since

the end of January. This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be

soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening

out. This is not yet clear.”

613. Dr Blix added that Iraq had not “persisted” in attaching conditions to inspections.

Recent Iraqi initiatives could not be said “to constitute ‘immediate’ co-operation. Nor do

they necessarily cover all areas of relevance”; but they were “nevertheless welcome”.

614. Dr Blix was not reporting that he was unable to carry out inspections. He stated

that “Even with a pro-active Iraqi attitude” it would still take “months” to “verify sites

and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons and draw conclusions”.

A document addressing unresolved disarmament issues and to identify key remaining

disarmament tasks, as required by resolution 1284 (1999), would be submitted later

that month.

615. Dr ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed nuclear

activities since the inspectors left in December 1998, and the recently increased level

of Iraqi co-operation should allow the IAEA to provide the Security Council with an

assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities in the near future.206

204 Telegram 417 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq: Side Statement and

End Game Options’.

205 UNMOVIC Briefing of the Security Council, 7 March 2003, ‘Oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report

of UNMOVIC’.

206 UN Security Council, ‘4714th meeting Friday 7 March 2003’ (S/PV.4714).

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