3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
1.
This Section
addresses the development of the UK position on Iraq
between
Mr Blair’s
meeting with President Bush on 31 January 2003, at which he sought
US
support for
a further, “second”, Security Council resolution before military
action was
taken, and
the meeting of the Security Council on 7 March, at which the UK, US
and
Spain
tabled a revised draft resolution stating that Iraq would have
failed to take the
final
opportunity offered by resolution 1441 unless the Council concluded
on or before
17 March
that Iraq was demonstrating “full, unconditional, immediate and
active
co‑operation”
with its obligations to disarm.
2.
During that
time, the UK Government was pursuing both intense
diplomatic
negotiations
with the US and other members of the Security Council about the
way
ahead on
Iraq and a pro-active communications strategy about why Iraq had to
be
disarmed,
if necessary by force, against the background of sharply divided
opinion
and constant
political and public debate about the possibility of military
action.
3.
Development of
UK strategy and options between 8 March and the start of
military
action
overnight on 19/20 March is addressed in Section 3.8.
4.
Other key
developments in February and early March are addressed
elsewhere
in the Report,
including:
•
The
provision of advice by Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney General, on the
legal
basis for
military action to secure Iraq’s compliance with its
disarmament
obligations
is addressed in Section 5.
•
The
planning for military operations in southern Iraq and preparations
to equip
the forces
deployed are addressed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3
respectively.
•
UK planning
and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is
addressed
in Section
6.5.
•
Advice and
briefings on Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile
capabilities
and its intentions in relation to concealing them from inspections
and
in response
to military action are addressed in Section 4.3.
•
By the time
the Security Council met on 7 March 2003 there were deep
divisions
within it
on the way ahead on Iraq.
•
Following
President Bush’s agreement to support a second resolution to
help
Mr Blair,
Mr Blair and Mr Straw continued during February and early
March 2003
to develop
the position that Saddam Hussein was not co-operating as required
by
resolution
1441 (2002) and, if that situation continued, a second resolution
should
be adopted
stating that Iraq had failed to take the final opportunity offered
by the
Security
Council.
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