The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Such a gap
should be avoided as it would place GOC MND(SE) in an
extremely
difficult
position with regards to the effective provision of security in
Basra.”519
946.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted:
“Any
pressure on de‑latching the handover of Basra Palace and PIC should
be
resisted,
however, it was recognised that some very limited flexibility may
be
required in
order to avoid a potential ‘falling‑out’ with the US on the run‑up
to the
delivery of
the Petraeus/Crocker report.”
947.
After
discussions in Baghdad, on 26 June a note containing Lt Gen
Lamb’s
comments on
the 20 June submission on cease‑fire negotiations was sent to
VAdm
Style. It
said:
“SBMR‑I
would wish to offer the following comment, for consideration
alongside
[the submission]:
•
He remains
generally supportive of an [UK] approach;
•
He suspects
there might have been an underestimation of the sensitivity of
the
GOI/PM
position;
•
He suspects
that there is a possibility at least that this local initiative
might
undermine
the broader engagement;
•
He suspects
that [Gen Petraeus] would be unlikely to agree to ‘a
continued
suspension
of strike operations from the coalition in Basra province’;
and
•
Noting the
difficulty of capturing the detail of such negotiations on paper,
he
senses from
the overall tone of [the submission] that there might be a lack of
a
hard edge
to the MNF‑I side of the agreement; in particular, that MNF‑I
would
seek
[JAM1]’s ‘approval’ for coalition action seems
inappropriate.”520
948.
On 26 June, a
senior government official specialising in the Middle East
(2)
submitted
supplementary advice to Mrs Beckett, via Mr Richmond, copied
to Mr Bowen
and Mrs
Beckett’s Principal Private Secretary.521
The senior
official wrote:
“Discussions
on … cease‑fire talks with JAM detainee [JAM1] – have
continued
in Basra
and Baghdad since my submission on 21 June. Both SBMR‑I and
HMA
Baghdad
have additional comments, based on their reading of the final draft
of
the
submission and subsequent exchanges with [officials working closely
with the
military on
the ground in Iraq]. I would be grateful if you could connect this
letter with
the …
submission.”
519
Minutes, 26
June 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
520
Minute
[junior officer on behalf of SBMR‑I] to DCDS(C), 26 June 2007,
‘[NAME OF OPERATION]
submission
– SBMR‑I comment’.
521
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to
Richmond and Foreign
Secretary,
26 June 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION] – Shia engagement’.
178