The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
388.
Sir Kevin
confirmed he considered Mr Perle’s thinking to be “flawed” and that
the
UK had not
been challenging it sufficiently strongly.184
389.
The MOD
subsequently concluded that there was “no Northern Alliance
equivalent
… who could
take advantage of precision bombing” in Iraq.185
390.
On 7 December,
Kandahar fell to anti-Taliban forces led by Mr Hamid
Karzai,
supported
by US Marines.186
391.
Sir Richard
Dearlove advised No.10 at the end of December that it would
be
very much
in the Government’s interest to work with the US and that the
outcome
of US
thinking would be of “enormous significance” to the national
interest.
392.
Following the
discussion in Washington on 5 December, Sir Richard
Dearlove
asked SIS4
and SIS7 to hold follow up talks on Iraq.187
He reported
the outcome of the
talks to
Sir David Manning on 27 December, with details of the discussions
between
SIS and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
393.
SIS4 had
suggested a “middle ground” option should be examined. That would
be
to create
conditions within Iraq which, with air support, could act as a
catalyst for a coup
which would
bring Saddam Hussein down within the next one to two
years.
394.
Sir Richard
advised that the outcome of US thinking was likely to be “an
intelligent
and
co-ordinated push for regime change, but a more aggressive military
campaign
cannot be
ruled out”. If it were the former, the US would look for UK
support. There
had been no
discussion about what the US would expect from the UK in the event
of
a military
campaign.
395.
Sir Richard
suggested that if a US policy decision went “the right way” he
believed
that it
would be:
“… very
much in HMG’s interest to work with the Americans. We have a
contribution
to make and
the outcome is of enormous significance for our national
interest.”
396.
As Section 3.2
shows, Mr Straw does not seem to have been informed of
SIS
discussions
with the US until 19 February 2002.
397.
While Sir
David Manning had confirmed in early December that the US
was
conducting
a full review of all its options, there are no indications that the
UK was
aware that
President Bush had specifically commissioned General Franks to
look
at military
options for removing Saddam Hussein; and that that would
include
options for
a conventional land invasion.
184
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 5.
185
Minute
Cholerton to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 January 2002, ‘Iraq:
No Fly Zones’.
186
Bush
GW. Decision
Points. Virgin
Books, 2010.
187
Letter
Dearlove to Manning, 27 December 2001, ‘Iraq Policy’.
378