The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
611.
DFID’s focus
on poverty reduction and the channelling of assistance
through
multilateral
institutions instilled a reluctance, before the invasion, to engage
on anything
other than
the immediate humanitarian response to conflict.
612.
When military
planners advised of the need to consider the civilian component
as
an integral
part of the UK’s post‑conflict deployment, the Government was not
equipped
to respond.
Neither the FCO nor DFID took responsibility for the
issue.
613.
The shortage
of expertise in reconstruction and stabilisation was a
constraint
on the
planning process and on the contribution the UK was able to make to
the
administration
and reconstruction of post‑conflict Iraq.
614.
The UK
Government’s post‑invasion response to the shortage of
deployable
experts in
stabilisation and post‑conflict reconstruction is addressed in
Section 10.3.
615.
Constraints on
UK military capacity are addressed in Sections 6.1 and
6.2.
616.
The UK
contribution to the post‑conflict humanitarian response is
assessed
in Section
10.1.
617.
At no stage
did Ministers or senior officials commission the systematic
evaluation
of
different options, incorporating detailed analysis of risk and UK
capabilities, military
and
civilian, which should have been required before the UK committed
to any course
of action
in Iraq.
618.
Where policy
recommendations were supported by untested assumptions,
those
assumptions
were seldom challenged. When they were, the issue was not
always
followed
through.
619.
It was the
responsibility of officials to identify, analyse and advise on risk
and
Ministers’
responsibility to ensure that measures to mitigate identifiable
risks, including
a range
of policy options, had been considered before significant decisions
were taken
on the
direction of UK policy.
620.
Occasions when
that would have been appropriate included:
•
after
Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Hoon, Mr Straw and others
on 23 July 2002;
•
after the
adoption of resolution 1441;
•
before or
immediately after the decision to deploy troops in January
2003;
•
after the
Rock Drill (a US inter‑agency rehearsal for post‑conflict
administration)
in February
2003; and
•
after
Mr Blair’s meeting on post‑conflict issues on 6 March
2003.
621.
There is no
indication of formal risk analysis or formal consideration of
options
associated
with any of those events.
82