The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
154.
In the
immediate aftermath of any conflict, the military administration’s
priorities
should be
to:
•
cap any oil
well fires and prevent damage to oil infrastructure;
and
•
restore
production by repairing existing oil production
facilities.
155.
The “interim
administration” that followed would lead on the rehabilitation
and
longer-term
development of Iraq’s oilfields, including tendering contracts for
the
exploration
and exploitation of new areas. Deferring such work until a new
Iraqi
Government
was in place would “seriously delay the maximisation of Iraq’s oil
revenue
and
increase the cost to the international community of its
reconstruction”. It would be
important
to ensure that:
“•
any such
moves were clearly in the interests of the Iraqi economy and
people;
•
the interim
administration had an appropriate UN mandate;
•
everything
was done in as transparent a manner as possible; and
•
production
was not pushed beyond OPEC-type depletion rates, even
though
that could
be in the interests of the Iraqi people.”
156.
The paper
stated that the OFF programme would need to be adjusted so that
it
could
operate effectively after any conflict. That could only be done
through the Security
Council.
The paper cautioned against seeking to use OFF programme funds to
cover the
cost of
military occupation, as some in the US were suggesting, as this
would “inevitably
raise
accusations that the military action was motivated by
oil”.
157.
The paper
concluded that in the aftermath of any conflict, the
“international
administration”
should seek to ensure that:
•
Iraqi oil
revenues were available to be used for the benefit of Iraq;
and
•
all Iraqi
oil industry business was handled in as transparent a manner
as
possible,
“to rebut allegations about oil motivations”.
158.
The paper
identified a number of next steps for the UK,
including:
•
to convene
a meeting with UK oil companies to explore the UK’s ideas and
tap
into their
expertise;
•
to start
preliminary work to ensure that UK firms were well placed to pick
up
contracts.
That work was already in hand;
•
to factor
rapid assistance for oilfield installations into UK military
planning; and
•
to start
thinking about appropriate wording for UN resolutions. That was
also
already in
hand.
159.
Mr Straw
commented: “V[ery] good paper.”81
81
Manuscript
comment Straw, 2 March 2003, on Minute Chilcott to Private
Secretary [FCO], 28 February
2003, ‘Iraq
Day After – Oil Policy’.
398