9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
763.
On 25 April,
in a telegram which set the scene for Mr Browne’s visit to
Iraq,
Mr Asquith
said that it was hard to provide evidence of a significant
improvement in the
security
conditions in Baghdad as a result of Operation Fardh
al‑Qanoon:
“Targeted
sectarian assassinations and Shia militia presence on the streets
remain
at much
reduced levels compared to January. But both continue to
fluctuate.
Spectacular
attacks are continuing to push up the casualty levels and play
strongly
in the
media. Al Qaida (AQ) are determined both to prove that they can
still operate
… and to
exacerbate sectarian violence. Shia retaliation has been contained,
but the
dyke of
self restraint will not hold forever. The full effect of FAQ [Fardh
al‑Qanoon]
still
awaits full surge, expected by the end of June. Meanwhile, Shia and
Sunni both
claim they
are being targeted by Iraqi and coalition forces …
“In Basra,
JAM are continuing to demonstrate their capability to attack us and
take
our lives.
But in reality they are primarily engaged in a messy internecine
struggle …
This is
about the politics of power pursued principally by
criminality.”418
764.
Mr Asquith
also reported US activity to drive forward
reconciliation:
“Gates’s
message to the Iraqis during his recent visit was that the clock
was ticking
for Iraqi
delivery on reconciliation. Petraeus and Crocker have signed off on
a
strategic
assessment which … will form the basis of the new campaign plan in
May.
It differs
from previous plans in identifying political agreement between
Iraqi leaders
as a
precondition for delivering security …”
765.
Mr Robert
Tinline, Deputy British Consul General in Basra, reported on 26
April that
the
political struggle in Basra, and discussions over Governor Waili’s
future, continued.419
He
explained:
“… Basra
may be on the brink of a new accommodation between the
principal
political
blocs: Fadhila, SCIRI/Badr and OMS/JAM. It is hard to see a
compromise
which
protects everyone’s interests … We are staying in frequent touch
with key
figures,
reinforcing the need for a resolution through peaceful,
constitutional means,
and the
potential impact of widespread violence, not least on the transfer
of security.
MND(SE) are
continuing to make it clear to the relevant Iraqi security
authorities that
it is up to
them to take the lead in controlling the situation, but that they
would be
able to act
in support if requested.”
418
eGram
16933/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 April 2007, ‘Iraq: Scenesetter
for Visit by Secretary of
State for
Defence, 30 April’.
419
Letter
Tinline to Aldred, 26 April 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
143