The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
113.
On the threat
posed by Muqtada al-Sadr and the Shia militia:
“In the
wake of the Najaf crisis … the Sadrists are down but not out …
Since the
Najaf
agreement … the JAM leadership has indicated their intention to
retain heavy
weapons for
future use. Our conclusion is that despite the recently brokered
truce
with the
Sadrists in Basra and al-Sadr’s proclaimed determination to follow
a political
path, the
threat to British forces remains high. Post-handover, our ability
to disrupt
it
unilaterally is curtailed but … there may be opportunities to work
with the Iraqis to
neutralise
elements of the Sadrist militia leadership.”
114.
Maj Gen Rollo
reported to Air Chief Marshal Glenn Torpy, the Chief of
Joint
Operations,
on 8 September that the situation in MND(SE) had
improved.52
There
had been:
“… no
hostile incidents of note over the past week in MND(SE), and on
some days
there have
been no hostile incidents at all. Just as the confrontation in
Najaf ramped
up the
tension down here, so its apparent resolution has seen an abrupt
end to the
militia
attacks against us.”
115.
On 9
September, Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Mr David Quarrey (a Private
Secretary
to Mr
Blair) sent Mr Blair a minute reporting their recent visit to Iraq,
for use in Mr Blair’s
planned
video conference with President Bush.53
116.
Sir Nigel and
Mr Quarrey reported that they had:
“… heard a
range of views on the key issues (Americans mostly more
optimistic,
Brits and
Allawi less so.) We have heard some impressive numbers … but we
have
heard such
numbers before, and delivery is far from certain. The only safe
prediction
is that the
going will continue to be very tough.”
117.
Sir Nigel and
Mr Quarrey explained that a “joined up programme was
needed”
and highlighted:
•
The ongoing
development of an effective counter-insurgency strategy to
“regain
control of
cities in the Sunni triangle”. The ISF would lead the exercises,
but
would
require significant MNF-I support.
•
Continued
Iraqiisation of security forces which could take until well into
2006;
further
progress would require “the NSC [National Security Council] and
Number
Ten …
to be all over these issues” to keep the pressure
up.
•
The lack of
a worked-out IIG strategy for Sunni outreach.
•
The
logistical challenge of elections, and the likelihood that
candidates would
“pronounce
on the timing of the departure of the MNF”.
52
Minute
Rollo to CJO, 8 September 2004, ‘GOC MIND (SE) – Iraq Update – 08
September 2004’.
53
Minute
Sheinwald and Quarrey to Blair, 9 September 2004,
‘Iraq’.
414