The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in their
[the IECI’s] list”.192
As a
result, if the government supported the Commission’s
recommendations,
it would be seen as a political decision and was “potentially
very
divisive”.
The IPU suggested that Mr Straw should seek Prime Minister
Ja’afari’s
agreement
to putting de‑Ba’athification on hold until after the elections,
when it could
be “addressed
by a new, and fully representative, national assembly and
government”.
239.
On 12
December, the British Embassy Baghdad reported that the IECI had
issued
a statement
setting out why it would not be removing any candidates from the
electoral
lists as a
result of their identification as Ba’athists by the
de‑Ba’athification Council.193
Prime
Minister Ja’afari had responded to the IECI’s request for guidance
in support
of that
decision.
240.
A “Work Plan”
for the post‑election period, drafted by the IPU in December
2005,
said that
the UK needed to:
“Press for
early review of de‑Ba’athification Commission (as provided for
under
Constitution)
and continue to stall de‑Ba’athification of (successful)
electoral
241.
Once elections
had taken place, Mr Straw spoke by telephone to
President
Talabani on
21 December.195
He
emphasised that:
“… the
process of de‑Ba’athification should not be allowed to derail the
formation of
a new
Government. It was important that Sunni Arabs did not feel
excluded, with the
risk that
the insurgency would continue and escalate to civil
war.”
242.
Mr Straw
made similar points in a call to Mr Barzani the following day,
explaining
UK concern
about “overzealous de‑Ba’athification” and stressing the need for
a
consensus
government with Sunni representation.196
243.
On 24
December, the British Embassy Baghdad reported the outcome of
the
case
brought by the de‑Ba’athification Commission against the
IECI.197
The
Transitional
Electoral
Panel found against the IECI, which consequently decided to remove
all the
candidates
identified by the Commission from their party lists. The British
Embassy
Baghdad
reported that this would affect three individuals who would
otherwise have
taken up a
seat at governorate level, and others who were candidates for
national seats.
192
Submission
IPU [junior official] to Foreign Secretary, 9 December 2005, ‘Iraq:
Human Rights/
De‑Ba’athification:
Telephone Call to Prime Minister Ja’afai’.
193
eGram
20573/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections:
Final Preparations’.
194
Paper IPU,
16 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Post‑Election: UK Work Plan’.
195
Email
Wilson to Asquith, 22 December 2005, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Call to
Talabani: 21 Dec’.
196
Email
Wilson to Asquith, 22 December 2005, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Call to
Barzani, 22 December’.
197
eGram
21681/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 28 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Elections:
Results’.
46