The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

537.  Mr Prentice concluded:

“We need an approach that is ambitious in its vision, but remains flexible in its

implementation:

• We must continue to remain engaged on the ground, both militarily and in a

civilian capacity in Baghdad, Basra and Erbil.

• Even as that engagement shifts from being primarily military … the security

situation will still require us to provide protection to those engaged in our

civilian efforts.

• We must not underestimate the scale of the task of helping to rebuild Iraq,

nor the time it will take to achieve conditions when we can revert to a normal

relationship with Iraq …

• Our effort will need to continue to draw on the contributions of a wide range

of government departments – including, but not only, FCO, DFID, MOD

(civilian and military) …”

“Given our best assessment of the prospects for security and our operating

conditions, it would be a mistake to imagine that, in 12 months time, we might be

free to start drawing down UK forces in southern Iraq below the … figure that we will

be at next spring. There remains an enormous amount at stake for the UK in Iraq …”

538.  On 24 October, a splinter group – the Iraq National Gathering (ING) – announced

that it was breaking away from the main Sadrist movement.255 Maj Gen Binns reported

that the announcement led to a “flurry of speculation that this may be the ‘next big

thing’” because its leadership appeared to involve individuals closely associated

with the Special Groups. Amidst indications of frustration with the JAM ‘freeze’

among its grassroots support, he judged that the ING had the potential to siphon off

disaffected elements.

539.  Government officials working closely with the military met a Basrawi Judge

suggested by JAM1 as a possible interlocutor on 24 October.256 The officials reported

that the Judge said that he was prepared to be an OMS public face in future negotiations

but also “made it very clear where his loyalty and instincts lie – he is a Sadrist and he

wants [JAM1] out of the DIF now”.

540.  On 25 October, the Reconciliation Steering Group (RSG), successor body to the

MIG, met and agreed a negotiating plan drafted by officials.

255  Minute Binns to CJO, 15 November 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 15 November 2007’.

256  Email government official working closely with the military, 27 October 2007, ‘[NAME OF OPERATION]:

Meeting with [JAM1] 26 October’.

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